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ABSTRACT 
 
Unethical pro-organizational behavior (UPB) occurs when employees engage in 
unethical actions for the purpose of benefiting their organization. UPB shares antecedents 
with counterproductive work behavior, but also with organizational citizenship behavior. 
In order to explain UPB’s unique combination of antecedents, this study examined the 
opposing motivational mechanisms behind UPB: organizational concern and ethical 
sensitivity. This study’s central focus was to empirically substantiate the conflicting 
positive and negative effects of ethical climate on UPB, demonstrating support for 
organizational climate theory and UPB theory. 
Perceptions of ethical climate and goals climate (operationalized at the 
department level) were used to show the effect of environmental factors on UPB. 
Individuals’ organizational identification, moral potency, and ethical ideology were 
included to demonstrate the effect of individual attributes on UPB. To accurately 
represent the complex relationships between these factors and UPB, structural equation 
modeling was used to create a single interconnected model. Survey responses were 
collected online from 400 participants from a wide variety of organizations. 
Ethical climate was found to decrease department-wide UPB and individuals’ 
willingness towards UPB through direct effects, but increased individuals’ willingness 
towards UPB through a mediation effect involving organizational identification. The 
direct effect of ethical climate on individuals’ UPB was curvilinear, such that only highly 
ethical climates exerted an appreciable direct negative effect on individuals’ UPB. The 
total causal effect of ethical climate on individuals’ UPB resulted in an inverse U-shaped 
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relationship. Ethical climate and goals climate interacted to influence individuals’ 
willingness towards UPB: goals climate increased individuals’ UPB when ethical climate 
was high and decreased individuals’ UPB when ethical climate was low. Moral potency 
demonstrated the single largest direct effect and the largest total effect on individuals’ 
UPB, drastically reducing individuals’ willingness to engage in UPB. Individuals’ 
idealistic ethical ideology also decreased individuals’ willingness towards UPB. The 
results of this study advance UPB and organizational climate research by deconstructing 
the multifaceted relationship between ethical climate and UPB and also by demonstrating 
the effect of multiple climates interacting to predict UPB. This study was also the first to 
identify moral potency as a powerful influencing factor on UPB. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Concern over unethical business practices has grown increasingly salient in recent 
years as reports of employees prioritizing profits over morals become more frequent. 
From the Enron scandal that precipitated the financial crisis to the recent revelation of 
Volkswagen’s rigged emissions systems, countless examples exist of employees who will 
stop at nothing to help their company succeed, even at the expense of harming bystanders 
in the process. Organizations must find effective strategies to prevent these harmful 
business practices, not only to uphold their ethical responsibility to their customers and 
community, but also to protect themselves from the legal liability and reputation damages 
organizations often suffer when these unethical practices are uncovered (Pierce & 
Aguinis, 2013). 
Enron and Volkswagen serve as examples of the potential consequences of 
actions employees take with company benefit in mind. A core group of Enron’s 
executives prioritized stock price and company profits above all else, and the eventual 
result was the largest bankruptcy in American history at the time (Bratton, 2012). The 
total economic loss associated with Enron’s collapse was in the tens of billions, mostly 
borne by shareholders and employees, but also felt by the American economy at large. In 
a more recent instance, an unknown number of Volkswagen engineers designed a device 
to allow Volkswagen’s diesel engines to pass emissions inspections while still emitting 
up to 40 times the legal limit of pollutants (Chappell, 2015). This allowed Volkswagen’s 
diesel vehicles to outperform their competitors in cost efficiency and horsepower, 
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increasing Volkswagen’s sales and stock value. Within two weeks of the discovery of this 
fraud, Volkswagen stock lost 30 percent of its former value and posted an annual net loss 
for the first time in 15 years (Chew, 2015). Furthermore, one cannot understate the 
environmental and public health consequences of the estimated 1 million tons of excess 
pollutants caused by Volkswagen’s fraud (Mathiesen & Neslen, 2015).  
While these extreme cases are relatively rare, smaller versions of similar behavior 
are common in many parts of the business sector. From a salesperson overstating the 
effectiveness of a product to drive sales to a manager rushing through food safety 
procedures to maintain the production schedule, the pressures of achieving company 
goals often lead to sacrifices in ethicality. Even with these smaller transgressions, the 
potential consequences to the victims and to the company generally outweigh any 
company profit gained by the actions. The most egregious pro-organizational ethical 
breaches, like those in Enron and Volkswagen, occur relatively infrequently; as such, 
they are likely to be a statistical improbability for any one organization. Despite this, the 
severity of the potential consequences of such an occurrence are so great that it would be 
irresponsible not to treat these behaviors as a serious threat.  
A bourgeoning body of research strives to understand the individual and 
situational risk factors of immoral pro-organizational behaviors in order to provide 
organizations with the tools necessary to discourage these behaviors in the workplace. 
Although studied under many different names, the term unethical pro-organizational 
behavior (UPB) has emerged as an umbrella concept to connect all the separate areas of 
literature (Umphress & Bingham, 2011). UPB is defined as “actions that are intended to 
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promote the effective functioning of the organization or its members (e.g., leaders) and 
violate core societal values, mores, laws, or standards of proper conduct” (Umphress & 
Bingham, 2011, p. 622). 
This proposal will first offer an examination of UPB as a scientific construct. I 
will (1) review the conceptual definition of UPB, considering many taxonomies of 
workplace behavior to delineate UPB’s key defining features. I will then present the 
current understanding of UPB in the scientific literature by (2) reviewing the empirical 
research on UPB and (3) discussing the theoretical frameworks that have been used to 
explain UPB. 
Next, I will propose my current study as the most effective way to advance UPB 
research, offering theoretical and empirical evidence to support my assertion. I will (4) 
suggest an under-examined predictor of UPB, organizational climate, as the next logical 
focus of UPB research. Integrating organizational climate theory and UPB research, I will 
offer my predictions for how organizational climate affects UPB. I will then (5) introduce 
two individual characteristics that I predict will moderate the relationship between 
organizational climate and UPB: ethical ideology and moral potency. My goal in this 
proposed study is to not only determine the direct relationship between organizational 
climate and UPB, but also to understand the nature of the relationship between climate 
and UPB while considering several moderating and mediating factors. 
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Defining Unethical Pro-Organizational Behavior 
Intent to benefit the organization. 
Vardi and Wiener (1996) made a major contribution to UPB theory by 
categorizing employee misbehavior based on the intentions behind the behavior; this 
separates counterproductive work behavior (CWB) from UPB. They introduced the 
construct of organizational misbehavior (OMB), which they defined as “any intentional 
action by members of organizations that defies and violates (1) shared organizational 
norms and expectations, and/or (2) core societal values, mores and standards of proper 
conduct” (Vardi & Wiener, 1996, p. 153). These researchers separated OMB into three 
categories based on the intention behind the behavior: Type D (intentions to inflict 
damage), Type S (intentions to benefit the self), and Type O (intentions to benefit the 
organization). While Type D and Type S fit the definition of CWB, Type O is analogous 
to UPB. Vadera and Pratt (2013) constructed a theory similar to OMB, separating 
workplace crimes based on the intended purpose of the crime. The workplace crime 
categories were congruent with those of OMB, but were called anti-organizational 
(intended to damage), non-aligned organizational (self-benefiting) and pro-organizational 
(UPB-like). 
These publications are integral contributions to UPB theory for their 
acknowledgment that some deliberate employee misbehavior is intended to be pro-
organizational. However, the definition of OMB encompasses both actions that are 
unethical (violations of core societal values) and actions that simply go against the 
organization’s wishes (violations of organizational norms; Vardi & Wiener, 1996). This 
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is also true for the definition of workplace crimes (Vadera & Pratt, 2013). UPB only 
includes pro-organizational actions that violate societal ethical standards, as opposed to 
actions that simply violate organizational norms and expectations. For example, if a baker 
breaks company policy by changing a signature recipe in hopes of attracting more 
customers, she would have committed OMB-D and pro-organizational workplace crime, 
but not UPB. However, if that baker chose to bake with expired ingredients in order to 
save her company money, her actions could be described as UPB as well as OMB-D and 
pro-organizational workplace crime. 
Violating societal ethical standards. 
Warren (2003) distinguished employee deviance on the dimensions of compliance 
versus violation of organizational norms and compliance versus violation of societal 
ethical norms; this taxonomy also helps to define UPB. Using these categorizations, 
Warren (2003) described four types of employee deviance: (1) constructive-conformity 
(conforms to both organization and societal ethical norms), (2) constructive-deviance 
(violates organization norms, but conforms to societal ethical norms), (3) destructive-
conformity (conforms to organization norms but violates societal ethical norms) and (4) 
destructive-deviance (violates both organization and societal ethical norms). They noted 
that some deviance is positive, such as organizational citizenship behavior (OCB). OCB 
is discretionary extra-role behavior employees perform on their own volition to help 
support their coworkers or their company (Borman, 2004). OCB falls under the 
constructive-conformity category, and is deviant in the sense that OCBs are beyond the 
normal in-role expectations of the employee (Warren, 2003). Constructive-deviance is 
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also considered positive, as this category represents actions that oppose any norms or 
expectations of the organization that would violate societal ethical norms. Whistle 
blowing behaviors fall under the constructive-deviance category. 
Destructive-conformity and destructive-deviance are both considered harmful, as 
they represent behaviors that violate societal ethical norms. If an organization explicitly 
or implicitly condones the harmful behaviors, then these behaviors are categorized as 
destructive-conformity. If the harmful behavior violates both societal and organizational 
ethical expectations, this is considered destructive-deviance. UPB can fall under both 
destructive-conformity and destructive-deviance. To be considered UPB, a behavior must 
be extra-role, or discretionary on the part of the employee; this qualifies the behavior as 
deviant, under Warren’s (2003) theory. To qualify as UPB, actions also must “violate 
core societal values, mores, laws, or standards of proper conduct” in pursuit of 
organizational gains: this is a violation of societal ethical norms (Umphress & Bingham, 
2011, p. 622). Furthermore, the definition of UPB includes all pro-organizational ethical 
violations, regardless of whether they violate the organization’s norms or expectations. If 
it is the norm within the organization to prioritize the organization’s goals to the point of 
violating societal morals, then UPB in that company is destructive-conformity. If, on the 
other hand, an employee goes against the norms of the organization to commit UPB, then 
this is considered destructive-deviance. 
Warren’s (2003) model of employee deviance does not distinguish actions based 
on the intended beneficiary: this means that destructive-conformity and destructive-
deviance both include actions that are committed for self-benefit along with actions that 
7 
were intended to be pro-organizational. This contrasts with UPB, which only includes 
pro-organizational behaviors that violate societal ethical norms, but does not differentiate 
based on organizational norms and expectations. 
UPB compared to detrimental citizenship behavior. 
The term that most closely aligns with UPB is detrimental citizenship behavior 
(DCB), which is defined as “behaviour that goes beyond reason and necessity to promote 
specific organizational goals and, in so doing, harms legitimate stakeholder interests” 
(Pierce & Aguinis, 2013, p. 4). Stakeholders in this context are any parties that might be 
affected by the actions of the organization, be it customers, employees, members of the 
surrounding community, or any other affected party (Donaldson & Preston, 1995). DCB, 
like UPB, is conceptualized as an umbrella construct that combines the same key features 
from the same employee behavior taxonomies used in defining UPB.  
Despite the significant similarities between DCB and UPB, the authors of DCB 
asserted that the two constructs differ: they state that DCB is conceptually broader than 
UPB because the measure of harm for DCB is more inclusive (Pierce & Aguinis, 2013). 
The authors defined DCB as behavior that “harms legitimate stakeholder interests,” 
whereas UPB’s stated definition includes that the behavior must “violate core societal 
values, mores, laws, or standards of proper conduct” (Pierce & Aguinis, 2013, p. 4; 
Umphress & Bingham, 2011, p. 622). Pierce and Aguinis (2013) argue that any pro-
organizational behavior that violates societal values or standards of conduct (viz., UPB) 
is by design a violation of stakeholder interests (i.e., DCB). Even if no outside party is 
truly harmed, employee actions that violate societal ethical values are damaging to the 
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organization’s image, and harming the organization’s image violates certain stakeholders’ 
interests. For this reason, they assert that all acts of UPB qualify as DCB. 
Pierce and Aguinis (2013) go on to claim that not all DCB is UPB, because DCB 
also includes actions that unreasonably adhere to societal rules or expectations in ways 
that unjustifiably harm legitimate stakeholder interests. One example of this type of 
behavior is the Bush administration’s decision to allow the NSA to secretly collect 
metadata from Americans’ phone communications (Mascaro, 2015). As an organization, 
one of the main objectives of the American government is to provide security for the 
American people from all potential threats; it is reasonable to assume that American 
society values and expects this protection. However, in the interest of advancing this 
organizational goal, individuals within the Bush administration implemented a program 
to indiscriminately collect bulk data on American citizens’ phone records without the 
knowledge of the American people and without congressional authorization. Although 
there are mixed sentiments on the subject, many Americans hold the opinion that the 
indiscriminant collection of citizens’ phone records unjustifiably violates individuals’ 
right to privacy, which is another fundamental value within American society. Pierce and 
Aguinis (2013) state that such actions could not be considered UPB because they comply 
with certain societal expectations, albeit in harmful and unjustifiable ways. I argue that 
this logic is disputable, because any pro-organizational behavior that unreasonably 
adheres to a specific societal standard of conduct (e.g., protecting Americans’ safety) to 
the point that it violates legitimate stakeholder interests (e.g., individuals’ right to 
privacy) would automatically also violate broader societal values. Therefore, these 
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special case DCB actions adhere to some aspect of societal norms, but still violate others, 
qualifying them as UPB. Taking these arguments into consideration, I assert that all acts 
of UPB are DCB, and likewise all acts of DCB are UPB. Although both terms appear 
equally informative in describing their shared construct, I choose to use the term UPB 
over DCB due to the greater amount of research literature featuring the term UPB 
(Castille, Buckner, & Thoroughgood, 2016; Effelsberg, Solga, & Gurt, 2014; Gils, Hogg, 
Van Quaquebeke, & van Knippenberg, 2015; Graham, Ziegert, & Capitano, 2015; 
Hannah, Jennings, Bluhm, Peng, & Schaubroeck, 2014; Ilie, 2012; Matherne III & 
Litchfield, 2012; Miao, Newman, Yu, & Xu, 2013; Ng & Feldman, 2015; Umphress & 
Bingham, 2011; Umphress, Bingham, & Mitchell, 2010; Vadera & Pratt, 2013; Verma & 
Mohapatra, 2015) compared to DCB (Pierce & Aguinis, 2013). 
Key definitional features of UPB. 
By comparing and contrasting UPB with related terms, researchers have 
thoroughly defined the features and boundary conditions of UPB (Pierce & Aguinis, 
2013; Umphress & Bingham, 2011). UPB is defined primarily based on two key features: 
(1) the behavior must be intended to benefit one’s organization, and (2) the behavior must 
violate societal ethical standards (Umphress & Bingham, 2011). To qualify as UPB, the 
behavior must also be extra-role (i.e., the behavior cannot be explicitly required as part of 
an employee’s job), and the action must be done deliberately (i.e., with knowledge of the 
ethical violation involved), but UPB is not required to violate organizational norms (e.g., 
the behavior may be implicitly condoned by the organization). Additionally, UPB always 
harms legitimate stakeholder interests in some way, as associated with the violation of 
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societal ethical standards (Pierce & Aguinis, 2013). See Table 1 for an overview of the 
shared and distinct defining features of UPB compared to related constructs. 
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Table 1: Definitions of and distinctions between employee behavior constructs.
Term Definition
Extra-role 
behavior?
Intended to 
benefit the 
organization?
Actions deliberate, 
with knowledge of 
consequences?
Unethical pro-organizational behavior Actions that are intended to promote the effective functioning of the 
organization or its members (e.g., leaders) and that violate core 
societal values, mores, laws, or standards of proper conduct.
Always Always Always
Detrimental Citizenship Behavior Discretionary employee behavior that goes beyond reason and 
necessity to promote specific organizational goals and, in so doing, 
harms legitimate stakeholder interests
Always Always Always
Deviant Workplace Behavior:    Destructive-
deviance
Behavior that violates both organizational norms and societal ethical 
standards
Always Sometimes Always
Deviant Workplace Behavior:    Destructive-
conformity
Behavior that aligns with organizational norms, but violates societal 
ethical standards
Always Sometimes Always
Organizational Misbehavior:  Type O Any intentional action by members of organizations, meant to benefit 
the organization, that defies and violates (i) shared organizational 
norms and expectations, and/or (ii) core societal values, mores and 
standards of proper conduct
Usually Always Always
Organizational Citizenship Behavior Extra-role behaviors intended help to support the essential functions of 
the organization.
Always Always Always
Counterproductive Work Behaviors Intentional employee behavior that violates the legitimate interests of 
the organization
Always Rarely Always
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Empirical Research on UPB 
 Previous empirical research has examined many possible predictors of UPB in 
order to gain an understanding of the organizational and individual risk factors of UPB. 
These findings have revealed that UPB shares many antecedents with both unethical 
workplace behaviors as well as OCBs. 
UPB antecedents shared with OCBs. 
 Many studies have found that UPB is correlated with variables previously thought 
to only have positive impacts on workplace behavior (LePine, Erez, & Johnson, 2002). 
These variables generally fall into two categories: individuals’ positive attitudes towards 
their organization, and variables that lead to positive employee attitudes.  
Positive correlations have been found between UPB and variables related to 
employees’ positive attitudes towards their organization (Effelsberg et al., 2014; 
Matherne & Litchfield, 2012; Miao et al., 2013; Umphress et al., 2010). Employees’ 
organizational identification has been found to increase individuals’ willingness to 
engage in UPB (Effelsberg et al., 2014; Umphress et al., 2010). High levels of 
organizational affective commitment have also shown to increase individuals’ 
willingness to engage in UPB (Matherne III & Litchfield, 2012). Additionally, strong 
identification with organizational leaders has been found to increase employees’ 
intentions to commit UPB (Miao et al., 2013).  
Many studies have also found evidence that certain supportive leadership styles 
and benevolent organizational climates are associated with increased UPB. Multiple 
studies have found that employees under transformational leadership are more willing to 
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engage in UPB compared to employees under transactional leadership (Effelsberg et al., 
2014; Graham et al., 2015). Additionally, a study examining the effects of ethical 
leadership found that, in some instances, an increase in ethical leadership was linked to 
an increase in UPB (Miao et al., 2013). This study found an inverted U-shaped 
relationship such that, when leadership ethicality was low or high, this resulted in less 
UPB than when ethical leadership was moderate, which resulted in the highest incidence 
of UPB (Miao et al., 2013). Even ethical organizational climate, another variable thought 
to increase employees’ ethical behavior as well as OCBs, has been found to be positively 
associated with UPB (Miao et al., 2013; Verma & Mohapatra, 2015).1 Despite all the 
findings that show the similarities in the predictors of OCB and UPB, UPB has not been 
found to be significantly correlated (positively or negatively) with OCB (Umphress et al., 
2010). 
UPB antecedents shared with unethical workplace behavior 
Although UPB is associated with many organizational variables that typically 
generate positive workplace behaviors, UPB also shares many predictors with unethical 
workplace behavior. Thus far, all the antecedents shared with unethical workplace 
behavior relate to individual employees’ personal sense of morality. 
Effelsberg and colleagues (2014) found that individuals’ personal disposition 
towards unethical behavior positively moderates the effect of organizational 
identification on individuals’ UPB; likewise, Matherne III and Litchfield (2012) found 
that employees’ level of moral identity negatively moderated the effect of organizational 
                                                          
1 A possible methodological explanation for the positive correlation between ethical climate and UPB will 
be discussed in a later section on organizational climate measurement considerations. 
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affective commitment on employees’ intentions to commit UPB. Machiavellianism, a 
personality trait linked to amoral manipulation and deception, has been found to greatly 
increase one’s willingness to engage in UPB (Castille et al., 2016). Individuals’ ethical 
ideology, classified as idealist (those who believe that harm to others is never justified) 
and relativist (those who reject the concept of universal moral principles), also has been 
found to influence individuals’ willingness to engage in UPB; individuals high in 
relativism were more willing to engage in UPB while individuals high in idealism were 
less willing to engage in UPB (Verma & Mohapatra, 2015). 
The evidence that UPB shares antecedents with both OCB and unethical 
workplace behavior is fascinating from a research perspective, but disturbing when 
considering the possible consequences from an organizational context. Organizations 
strive to create a supportive environment for their employees as this has been shown to 
have favorable effects such as increasing employee productivity and OCBs, and 
decreasing turnover (Borman, 2004; May, Gilson, & Harter, 2004). A supportive 
organizational environment produces these beneficial organizational outcomes at least in 
part through increasing employees’ positive attitudes towards their organization, as 
indexed by variables such as organizational identification and organizational affective 
commitment. Unfortunately, research has revealed that these same organizational and 
individual factors that foster positive organizational outcomes also increase UPB, even 
ethical leadership and ethical organizational climate, which by their very names are 
expected to decrease unethical behavior. 
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Although much time and effort is spent both in research and applied settings to 
combat unethical workplace behaviors such as employee theft and other CWBs, much 
less emphasis is placed on understanding and preventing UPB (Pierce & Aguinis, 2013; 
Umphress & Bingham, 2011; Umphress et al., 2010). Nevertheless, UPB can have 
disastrous consequences for both the organizations in which they occur and for the 
stakeholders that fall victim to them (Pierce & Aguinis, 2013). While it may be 
unrealistic to expect organizations to inhibit the organizational factors that encourage 
both beneficial organizational outcomes and UPB, it would be irresponsible to ignore the 
connection between positive organizational environments and UPB. Fortunately, 
researchers have utilized psychological theory to suggest a probable explanation for the 
unusual combination of antecedents associated with UPB. 
Theoretical Explanations of UPB 
Norm of reciprocity. 
While it may appear counterintuitive that transformational and ethical leadership 
and ethical climate have been found to increase incidents of UPB, researchers have 
explained these seemingly illogical relationships by asserting that employees are often 
motivated towards UPB because they are compelled to repay the perceived benefits they 
have received from their organization (Pierce & Aguinis, 2013; Umphress & Bingham, 
2011). The social norm of reciprocity is often cited in support of this explanation (Miao 
et al., 2013; Pierce & Aguinis, 2013; Umphress & Bingham, 2011). 
The norm of reciprocity refers to the belief that benefits given from one individual 
to another are generally repaid in kind, creating a cyclical pattern of favorable exchanges 
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(Gouldner, 1960). This also extends to employees’ relationships with their organization: 
an employee may feel compelled towards UPB if that employee feels they are otherwise 
unable to repay their obligation to their organization. Likewise, an employee may be 
motivated toward UPB due to an assumption that any benefit the employee achieves for 
his organization will be rewarded in equal measure (Umphress et al., 2010). Past research 
has found that employees who feel well supported by their organization tend to also feel 
an increased obligation to provide benefits for the organization in the form of achieving 
organizational goals (Organ, 1990); this is suggested to increase tendencies towards UPB 
(Umphress et al., 2010). Evidence suggests that supervisors utilizing transformational or 
ethical leadership styles tend to develop supportive relationships with their employees 
(Simola, Barling, & Turner, 2010; Treviño, Hartman, & Brown, 2000); considering the 
norm of reciprocity, this could explain the connection between these leadership types and 
employee UPB. Likewise, ethical organizational climate has been found to correlate with 
employees’ job satisfaction (Treviño, Butterfield, & McCabe, 1998), organizational 
identification (Verma & Mohapatra, 2015), and even a sense of indebtedness to the 
organization (Kelley & Dorsch, 1991); these relationships suggest that ethical 
organizational climate may increase UPB through increasing employees’ desire to 
achieve organizational goals as a form of repayment. 
Dueling motivational mechanisms. 
An additional theoretical explanation for UPB also emphasizes the motivational 
process leading to UPB, but extends this reasoning past that explained by the norm of 
reciprocity. DCM researchers assert that all predictors for DCB (and likewise for UPB) 
18 
fall into one of two categories: (1) variables that influence employees’ organizational 
concern, or (2) variables that influence employees’ ethical sensitivity (Pierce & Aguinis, 
2013). Organizational concern is defined as the extent to which an individual values the 
achievement of organizational goals, and ethical sensitivity is the extent to which an 
individual emphasizes ethical considerations when making decisions. Pierce and Aguinis 
(2015) argue that, when faced with an opportunity to commit DCB or UPB, these two 
motivational mechanisms lead to opposing action tendencies within the individual (Pierce 
& Aguinis, 2013). Based on this theory, the balance between organizational concern and 
ethical sensitivity predicts UPB: individuals with higher organizational concern than 
ethical sensitivity will be more likely to engage in UPB, whereas individuals whose 
ethical sensitivity outweighs their organizational concern will be less likely to engage in 
UPB. 
Dueling motivational mechanisms applied to the UPB model. 
The model theorized by UPB researchers aligns with the dueling motivational 
mechanisms theory; each of the proposed variables clearly influence either organizational 
concern or ethical sensitivity (Pierce & Aguinis, 2013; Umphress & Bingham, 2011). The 
UPB model emphasizes the impact of (1) positive social exchange and (2) organizational 
identification on (3) ethical neutralization. Ethical neutralization is defined as a cognitive 
mechanism used by the individual to reduce ethical salience and awareness when making 
ethical decisions (Umphress & Bingham, 2011). The UPB model also includes (4) amoral 
culture and (5) individual moral development as moderators, so that employees with 
lower moral development or who work for amoral organizations will tend to have 
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stronger ethical neutralization reactions. The researchers assert that higher levels of 
organizational identification, positive social exchange, ethical neutralization, and amoral 
culture will increase UPB, while higher levels of moral development will decrease UPB. 
Past research suggests that organizational concern and ethical sensitivity relate to the key 
components of the UPB model: organizational identification and positive social exchange 
influence organizational concern, and ethical neutralization, amoral culture, and moral 
development affect ethical sensitivity (Hannah et al., 2014; Pierce & Aguinis, 2013; 
Umphress et al., 2010; Vadera & Pratt, 2013).  
Dueling motivational mechanisms applied to known UPB predictors. 
All empirically supported predictors of UPB can also be explained using the 
theory of dueling motivational mechanisms. Ethical organizational climate, ethical 
leadership, and transformational leadership all increase employees’ organizational 
concern, as explained through the norm of reciprocity. Employees high in organizational 
affective commitment, organizational leader identification, or organizational 
identification also all tend to be motivated by organizational concern (Avey, Avolio, 
Crossley, & Luthans, 2009; Sluss & Ashforth, 2008). The theoretical effect of these 
variables on organizational concern could explain why they positively correlate with 
UPB (Effelsberg et al., 2014; Matherne III & Litchfield, 2012; Miao et al., 2013; 
Umphress et al., 2010). Likewise, individuals with strong moral identities and with an 
idealistic ethical ideology would have a high level of ethical sensitivity; individuals with 
higher personal disposition toward unethical behavior, those with a relativistic ethical 
ideology, and those high in Machiavellianism would have a lower level of ethical 
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sensitivity. These variables’ theoretical relationship with ethical sensitivity exactly 
mirrors their known relationships with UPB. 
The study examining ethical leadership and UPB is a multilayered example of the 
dueling motivational mechanisms. Ethical leadership is conceptualized to involve both 
encouraging employees to behave ethically and also always supporting employees by 
treating them fairly and ethically (Brown, Treviño, & Harrison, 2005). For this reason, 
ethical leadership appears to affect subordinates by increasing their organizational 
concern (explained by the norm of reciprocity), but also by increasing their ethical 
sensitivity.  
If leadership ethicality affected employee organizational concern in a linear 
fashion, but only significantly increased employee ethical sensitivity when ethical 
leadership was high, this would explain the non-linear relationship found between ethical 
leadership and UPB (Miao et al., 2013). When supervisors had low ethical leadership 
scores, UPB was also low; theoretically, this type of supervision would be associated 
with low employee ethical sensitivity but equally low employee organizational concern. 
When supervisors’ ethical leadership was moderate, this appeared to have a stronger 
impact on employees’ organizational concern than on their ethical sensitivity; the 
resulting imbalance could explain the significantly higher levels of UPB. Lastly, when 
supervisors’ ethical leadership was high, this resulted in decreased levels of UPB; this 
could be explained by the highly ethical leadership compelling employee ethical 
sensitivity to once again match employee organizational concern. Although this theory 
has not been empirically tested, the motivational mechanisms of organizational concern 
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and ethical sensitivity appear to complement the theoretical model of UPB as well as the 
empirical evidence concerning UPB predictors. 
Ethical decision making theory. 
Other theoretical explanations for UPB have focused on the process employees 
use to make workplace decisions. Each time an employee is presented with an 
opportunity to commit UPB, that employee performs an internal decision-making process 
to determine the best course of action (Pierce & Aguinis, 2013). Ethical decision-making 
(EDM) theory studies this process used by individuals when making decisions in 
situations involving ethical dilemmas (Rest, 1986). EDM theory delineates the four steps 
necessary to take the ethical action in a moral quandary: moral sensitivity (noticing the 
moral significance of a situation), moral judgment (determining the morally correct 
action), moral motivation (deciding whether to choose the morally correct option), and 
moral character (following through by engaging in the moral action). Based on the EDM 
theory, if an individual is able to successfully complete all four of these steps, then the 
ethical choice will be taken (O’Fallon & Butterfield, 2005; Rest, 1986; Trevino & Ball, 
1992). Research utilizing EDM theory typically theorizes the influence of various 
variables on one or more of the steps in the EDM process, searching for factors that 
might cause this process to go awry (Kish-Gephart, Harrison, & Treviño, 2010). 
EDM theory and dueling motivational mechanisms. 
DCB researchers suggest that the two motivational mechanisms of organizational 
concern and ethical sensitivity may predict employee UPB by influencing the EDM 
process (Pierce & Aguinis, 2013). These researchers assert that, when presented with an 
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opportunity to commit UPB, an employee may fail to notice the moral significance of the 
situation (i.e., fail the first step in the EDM process) if the employee’s ethical sensitivity 
is too low (Pierce & Aguinis, 2013). Furthermore, that employee may incorrectly 
determine the morally appropriate action or may decide to choose an immoral option (i.e., 
fail the second or third steps in the EDM process) if the employee’s level of 
organizational concern far outweighs that employee’s level of ethical sensitivity. 
The multiple theoretical explanations for UPB appear to complement rather than 
contradict each other, each explaining separate but related aspects of the internal process 
that lead employees to engage in UPB. The norm of reciprocity, EDM theory, and the 
concept of balance between organizational concern and ethical sensitivity are all integral 
to the theoretical basis for the present proposed study. 
Organizational Climate and UPB 
Perhaps the most unsettling finding in UPB research is the positive relationship 
between ethical climate and UPB; this suggests that the very environment that would 
logically be utilized to discourage UPB appears to have the opposite effect. However, 
considering the curvilinear relationship found between ethical leadership and UPB (Miao 
et al., 2013), it may be that ethical climate, like ethical leadership, has a multifaceted 
effect on UPB. While there is a methodological concern (which will be described in the 
coming pages) that may explain the positive linear relationship between ethical climate 
and UPB, this issue would be unable to account for the curvilinear relationship found 
between ethical leadership (a variable highly correlated with ethical climate; Demirtas & 
Akdogan, 2014; Mayer, Kuenzi, & Greenbaum, 2010) and UPB. 
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This proposal will add to the understanding of the relationship between 
organizational climate and UPB by integrating organizational climate theory with the 
other theories utilized in UPB research. In this section, I will first (1) offer an overview of 
organizational climate theory, followed by (2) an examination of the climates that I 
propose will most directly influence UPB. I will then (3) explain the measurement issues 
involved in organizational climate research as well as issues specific to ethical climate 
research, and (4) suggest the most accurate and valid methods for measuring climate in 
the proposed study. 
Organizational climate review. 
Organizational climate is defined as the “shared perceptions of and the meaning 
attached to the policies, practices, and procedures employees experience and the 
behaviors they observe getting rewarded and that are supported and expected” 
(Schneider, Ehrhart, & Macey, 2013, p. 362). Employees develop a sense of their 
organization’s climate by working with other employees in a shared environment, 
experiencing the organization’s policies, practices, and procedures first hand, interacting 
with subordinates, coworkers, and supervisors, and observing the experiences of other 
employees within the organization. Organizational climate gives employees guidelines 
for what they can expect from their organizational environment and how they should 
behave within the organization. Organizational climate has been found to have a 
powerful effect on employees, influencing employee behavior and attitudes above and 
beyond the effects of individual preferences, values, and beliefs (Ostroff, Kinicki, & 
Tamkins, 2003).  
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Organizational climates can be operationalized at any level within the 
organization (from company-wide to team units), depending on the referent used in the 
climate measure (Ehrhart & Raver, 2014). Departmental climate is the most common 
level to operationalize climate (Schneider et al., 2013); climate at the department level 
(defined as all employees directly under the same supervisor) has generally been found to 
have the strongest influence on employee behavior compared to other levels of climate 
(Andreoli & Lefkowitz, 2009; Kuenzi & Schminke, 2009). 
Molar climate. 
There are many types of organizational climate, from overall climate (molar 
climate) to a vast assortment of sub-climates (focused climates) that each index the 
climate of a particular aspect of organizational life. Organizational molar climate conveys 
the employees’ overall sense of whether their organization provides a positive work 
environment (Schneider et al., 2013). Molar climate measures often include items asking 
employees to rate how much their organization cares about its employees, how people-
oriented their organization is, and how well their organization treats its employees. 
Strategic climates. 
Focused climates can be sub-divided into strategic climates and process climates 
(Schneider et al., 2013). Strategic climates index employees’ perceptions of their 
organization’s expectations related to a particular strategic outcome. Strategic climates 
carry information about the level of priority placed on achieving a particular outcome, 
and what employee behavior is expected in relation to that outcome. Service climate is an 
example of a frequently studied strategic climate (Schneider, Macey, Lee, & Young, 
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2009). In organizations with strong service climates, employees perceive that their 
organization highly values customer service and that their organization expects 
employees to prioritize customer service with their actions. Furthermore, employees of 
organizations with strong customer service climates can expect to be rewarded for good 
customer service and can expect to be reprimanded for poor customer service. Successful 
strategic climates lead to specific changes in employee behavior which in turn lead to 
achievement of the strategic outcome. Studies have found that organizations with higher 
customer service climate have higher customer satisfaction scores (Schneider et al., 
2009), mediated by customer-oriented OCB (Schneider, Ehrhart, Mayer, Saltz, & Niles-
Jolly, 2005). 
Process climates. 
Process climates reflect an organization’s expectations related to a particular set 
of procedures or operating methods (Schneider et al., 2013). Process climates also carry 
information about the priorities of the organization and the organization’s behavioral 
expectations for its employees, but in relation to an organizational process as opposed to 
an organizational outcome. Procedural justice climate is an example of an organizational 
process climate. In organizations with strong procedural justice climates, employees 
perceive that their organization emphasizes the use of a fair process in resolving disputes 
and allocating resources, and that their organization expects its employees to maintain 
procedural justice in all work activities (Colquitt, Noe, & Jackson, 2002). Process 
climates tend to affect both employee attitudes as well as employee behavior: procedural 
justice climate has been linked to increased team performance (Colquitt et al., 2002), 
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increased OCBs (Ehrhart, 2004), decreased turnover (Simons & Roberson, 2003), and 
increased organizational commitment and satisfaction (Liao & Rupp, 2005). 
Foundational climates. 
Although strategic climates convey employees’ perceptions of the outcomes that 
are highly valued by their organization, it may take more than a strong strategic climate 
for an organization to attain those strategic outcomes. Climate researchers have suggested 
that foundational climates, including molar climate and some process climates (e.g., 
procedural justice climate, ethical climate, and work facilitation climate), must be in 
place before strategic climates can influence employee behavior to achieve the strategic 
outcome (Schneider, Ehrhart, & Macey, 2011). Foundational climates provide employees 
with the perception that their organization cares about supporting its employees, either in 
a general sense as with molar climate, or in a specific way as with certain process 
climates. In accordance with the norm of reciprocity, climate researchers argue that 
employees in organizations with established foundational climates will be motivated to 
repay their organization in the form of achieving organizational goals; employees will 
then look to their organizations’ strategic climates for information about which 
organizational goals they should prioritize. In other words, foundational climates increase 
the salience of strategic climates for employees and strengthen the relationship between 
strategic climates and the relevant organizational outcomes. In support of this theory, one 
study found that a combination of both supportive foundational climates and service 
climate was necessary to achieve the strategic outcome of high customer satisfaction 
(Schulte, Ostroff, Shmulyian, & Kinicki, 2009). Interestingly, moderate levels of 
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foundational climates were sufficient to allow service climate to take effect; they found 
little additional benefit to customer satisfaction as foundational climates increased from 
moderate to high levels. 
Climates relevant to UPB. 
Based on climate and UPB theory and research, I propose that a combination of 
ethical climate and goals climate will display a strong influence on individual and 
department-level UPB. 
Ethical climate. 
Ethical climate is defined as “the shared perception of what is correct behavior, 
and how ethical situations should be handled in an organization” (Victor & Cullen, 1987, 
p. 51). As described previously, ethical climate has been found to positively correlate 
with UPB, although theoretical arguments can be made for a more multifaceted 
relationship between ethical climate and UPB. Ethical climate is defined as a 
foundational process climate (Schneider et al., 2013). Like other foundational climates, 
ethical climate has been found to increase job satisfaction (Martin & Cullen, 2006; 
Neubert, Carlson, Kacmar, Roberts, & Chonko, 2009), organizational commitment 
(Kelley & Dorsch, 1991; Treviño et al., 1998), organizational identification (Verma & 
Mohapatra, 2015) and attitudinal engagement (Tseng & Fan, 2011). Ethical climate also 
influences the process through which employees react to ethical situations in the 
workplace; ethical climate has demonstrated to positively relate to employee moral 
intensity (DeConick, 2003), ethical judgements (Bartels, Harrick, Martell, & Strickland 
1998; DeConick, 2003), ethical intentions (Buchan, 2005), and moral decision making 
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(Verbeke, Ouwerkerk, & Peelen, 1996). Additionally, ethical climate has shown to 
negatively relate to employee theft and lying (Martin & Cullen, 2006), antisocial 
behavior (Mayer et al., 2010), and general unethical behavior (Peterson, 2002). 
Based on the known effects ethical climate has on employee behavior, the 
argument can be made that ethical climate relates to both motivational mechanisms 
thought to influence UPB. Ethical climate increases employees’ ethical sensitivity, as 
evidenced by ethical climate’s ability to decrease unethical behavior and improve 
employees’ ethical decision making. This indicates that ethical climate should decrease 
employees’ willingness in engage in all unethical behaviors, including UPB.2 Research 
has indicated that ethical climate also increases employees’ organizational concern. As 
with all foundational climates, organizations with strong ethical climates tend to engage 
their employees in a supportive way, engendering employees’ percieved organizational 
support and other positive attitudes towards their organization (Demirtas & Akdogan, 
2014). This increases employees’ organizational concern, motivating employees to repay 
their recieved benefits by achieving organizational goals. Higher organizational concern 
is suggested to increase willingness to engage in UPB (Pierce & Aguinis, 2013). 
If organizational concern could be measured and tested along with ethical climate 
as predictors of UPB, this may deconflate the two motivational influences ethical climate 
exerts on employees’ willingness to engage in UPB. After accounting for ethical 
                                                          
2 While it is likely that a highly ethical climate would discourage UPB, this does not mean that UPB could 
never occur in a highly ethical organization. This illustrates the difference between destructive-deviance 
UPB and destructive-conformity UPB. In a highly ethical organization, UPB would be destructive-
deviance, as the UPB would violate both societal and organizational ethical norms. In an organization with 
a low level of ethical climate, UPB may be considered destructive-conformity, as the UPB would still 
violate societal ethical standards but may be viewed as normative behavior within the organization. 
29 
climate’s effect on UPB through individuals’ organizational concern, I expect that ethical 
climate will be negatively related to UPB. The curvilinear relationship found between 
ethical leadership and UPB (Miao et al., 2013) may suggest that only highly ethical 
environments are effective at decreasing UPB; I expect the same will hold true for ethical 
climate and UPB. 
H1a: There will be a direct negative curvilinear relationship between ethical 
climate and individual willingness to engage in UPB; low and moderate levels of 
ethical climate will not significantly affect individual willingness to engage in 
UPB, while high levels of ethical climate will significantly reduce individual 
willingness to engage in UPB. 
I will be assessing participants’ level of organizational concern through a measure 
of organizational identification (described in the following paragraph), but as 
organizational concern will be measured in reference to the individual participant and not 
the participants’ work group, I will be unable to assess department-level organizational 
concern using my proposed methods (described in the next section). For this reason, I 
will be unable to deconflate the dual influences of ethical climate on department-level 
UPB. Consequently, I predict the effect of ethical climate on departmental UPB will be 
similar to the inverted U-shaped curvilinear relationship previously found between ethical 
leadership and UPB (Miao et al., 2013). 
H1b: There will be an inverted U-shaped curvilinear relationship between ethical 
climate and departmental UPB; low and high ethical climate will correspond to 
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lower levels of departmental UPB, whereas moderate ethical climate will 
correspond to higher levels of department UPB. 
Based on theory and past research, I expect organizational concern to be 
positively related to UPB. However, organizational concern is currently a purely 
theoretical construct used to explain the motivational mechanism linking certain variables 
(e.g., organizational identification and organizational affective commitment) to UPB; 
there are no existing scales to measure organizational concern directly. Despite this, I 
expect organizational identification, a variable cited as a major contributor to 
organizational concern (Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Pierce & Aguinis, 2013), will serve as a 
comparable substitute to examine the relationship between ethical climate and UPB. 
Organizational identification represents an employee’s sense of belonging to his or her 
organization and the extent to which the employee self-identifies with his or her 
organization (Ashforth & Mael, 1989). Highly identified employees internalize their 
organization’s goals as their own, directly leading to increased organizational concern. In 
this way, I expect that organizational identification will partially mediate the relationship 
between ethical climate and individual willingness to engage in UPB. 
H2a: Ethical climate will have a positive effect on organizational identification. 
H2b: Organizational identification will have a positive effect on individual 
willingness to engage in UPB. 
Goals climate. 
Organizational goals climate will also likely influence employees’ willingness to 
engage in UPB. Goals climate is defined as employees’ perceptions of the emphasis their 
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organization places on achieving organizational objectives, and their perceptions of the 
behavioral expectations placed on employees related to achieving company goals. 
Although goals climate has not yet been empirically studied, similar constructs such as 
performance pressure (felt pressure to meet organizational performance expectations) and 
instrumental climate (organizational climate valuing employee and organizational 
interests over all other concerns) have been found to lead to unethical employee sales 
tactics (Murphy & Free, 2015; Ross Jr & Robertson, 2003). Furthermore, key 
organizational antecedents that would theoretically lead to a strong goals climate (e.g., 
employee compensation tied to meeting organizational goals and supervisor emphasis of 
company goals) have also been linked to less ethical employee sales behavior (Robertson 
& Anderson, 1993; Román & Luis Munuera, 2005). For these reasons, I expect high 
organizational goals climate to increase individual willingness to engage in UPB as well 
as lead to increased amounts of UPB within the department. 
H3a: Organizational goals climate will have a positive effect on individual 
willingness to engage in UPB. 
H3b: Organizational goals climate will have a positive effect on departmental 
UPB. 
Goals climate is a strategic outcome climate; this means that employees must first 
be positively motivated before goals climate can effectivly change employee behavior 
towards the desired outcome of achieving company goals. Ethical climate, as a 
foundational climate, motivates employees’ efforts related to strategic climates. For this 
reason, I anticipate ethical climate will interact with goals climate to predict UPB. 
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H4a: Ethical climate will positively moderate the effect of goals climate on 
individual willingness to engage in UPB. 
H4b: Ethical climate will positively moderate the effect of goals climate on 
departmental UPB. 
Measuring ethical climate. 
Although organizational ethical climate has been studied empirically for over 25 
years (Victor & Cullen, 1987), there remains considerable disagreement regarding which 
measure is most valid for studying ethical climate (Mayer, 2014). While the majority of 
research examining ethical climate continues to use the oldest and most established 
climate measure, the Ethical Climate Questionnaire (ECQ; Victor & Cullen, 1988), there 
are several well-known flaws associated with the ECQ (Arnaud, 2010; Mayer, 2014; 
Mayer, Kuenzi, & Greenbaum, 2009). This has led to a call amongst researchers for the 
development of a more valid measure of ethical climate; several new measures have since 
been published (Arnaud, 2010; Babin, Boles, & Robin, 2000; Ross & Robertson, 2000; 
Schwepker, 2001). Following a description of the ECQ and its flaws, I will describe the 
Ethical Climate Index (ECI; Arnaud, 2010) and its advantages. Through this process, I 
will offer several reasons why the most appropriate measure of ethical climate for use in 
my proposed study is the Ethical Climate Index (ECI; Arnaud, 2010).  
Ethical Climate Questionnaire (ECQ). 
The ECQ is designed to measure an organization’s ethical climate by assessing 
employees’ perception of what constitutes “right” behavior. The ECQ designates 
organizations as having one of nine different types of ethical climate based on the 
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interests the organization favors when making ethical decisions. The nine types of ethical 
climate are defined based on where they fall on two dimensions: focus of analysis and 
ethical criterion. Ethical criterion refers to the types of outcomes that are favored when 
making ethical judgments; the three categories of ethical criterion are egoism (favoring 
self-interest), benevolence (favoring the outcome that benefits the most people), and 
principle (favoring compliance with rules, law, and procedures). Focus of analysis refers 
to the referent level used in decision-making; the three levels are individual, local 
(company-wide) and cosmopolitan (society-wide). By crossing the two dimensions, a 
three by three matrix is created with a different type of ethical climate occupying each 
space in the matrix. The nine ethical climate types include social responsibility 
(benevolence x cosmopolitan; favoring outcomes that do the most good society-wide), 
company rules and procedure (principle x local; favoring outcomes that comply with 
company rules), and self-interest (egoism x individual; favoring outcomes that will 
benefit oneself). 
Although the ECQ is theoretically composed of nine factors, there is little 
empirical evidence to support this typography (Arnaud, 2010; Martin & Cullen, 2006). 
While each of the nine factors have been observed to some extent in empirical research, 
the majority of studies using the ECQ have found only five factors (Martin & Cullen, 
2006). See Figure 1 for a representation of the theoretical versus empirically supported 
typographies of the ECQ. Additionally, the factor structure of the emergent ethical 
climate types has been inconsistent between studies (Arnaud, 2010). The lack of a stable 
factor number and structure is a major weakness of the ECQ; it calls the original 
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theoretical typography of the ECQ into question and negatively impacts the validity and 
reliability of the measure. 
Figure 1: Theoretical & Empirical Factor Typography of the ECQ. 
 
Note: Originally published in (Martin & Cullen, 2006, p. 178). 
 
Beyond the inconsistent factor number and structure, another shortcoming of the 
ECQ is its lack of utility for predicting ethical behavior in the workplace. This limitation 
has two potential contributing causes. First, the ECQ is designed to categorize 
organizations into descriptive “types” of ethical climate rather than to rank-order 
organizations based on normative level of ethicality. Some ECQ climate factors have 
been shown to correlate with employee ethical behavior, while others do not seem to 
have any relationship with ethical behavior; this means that higher scores on the ECQ do 
not necessarily translate to a more ethical organization (Martin & Cullen, 2006). Scores 
on the ECQ may be useful in sorting organizations into different ethical climate profiles, 
but much less useful in predicting which organizations will be more or less ethical than 
others. 
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Another possible reason that the ECQ has a weak capacity for predicting ethical 
behavior is that the ECQ only measures one step of the four-step process that EDM 
theory suggests is necessary to achieve ethical behavior. EDM theory applied to 
organizations would suggest that four conditions are necessary to generate ethical 
employee behavior: moral sensitivity (are employees aware of ethical dilemmas when 
they arise?), moral judgment (how do employees determine the ethically correct action?), 
moral motivation (do employees choose to take the ethically correct action?), and moral 
character (do employees follow through with their ethical intentions?). The ECQ 
measures organizations’ moral judgment, while ignoring moral sensitivity, moral 
motivation, and moral character. 
Ethical Climate Index (ECI). 
The ECI is a relatively new ethical climate measure produced in response to the 
call for an alternative to the ECQ (Arnaud, 2010). The author of the ECI argues that the 
four steps in the EDM process exist not only at the individual level, but also at the social 
system level; the ECI is therefore designed to measure an organization’s normative 
collective capacity to complete each of the four steps in the EDM process. Six factors are 
utilized to cover the four EDM steps of moral sensitivity, moral judgment, moral 
motivation, and moral character. Collective moral sensitivity is measured using two 
factors: Moral Awareness (capacity to envision possible alternative actions in a given 
situation) and Empathetic Concern (capacity to predict how those actions will affect 
others). Collective moral judgment reflects the typical criterion used in an organization to 
determine which possible action is correct. As this step in the collective EDM process has 
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been tested extensively by studies utilizing the ECQ, the ECI utilizes the items from the 
ECQ that consistently loaded the highest on the three categories of ethical criterion 
(egoism, benevolence and principle). From these ECQ items, the ECI creates two 
collective moral judgment factors: Focus on Self (egoism items) and Focus on Others 
(benevolence and principle items). The Moral Motivation factor measures the relative 
value placed on ethical concerns when making organizational decisions. This factor 
reflects an employees’ likelihood of choosing to pursue the ethical course of action as 
opposed to an alternative unethical action. Lastly, the Moral Character factor measures 
employees’ collective sense of efficacy concerning their ability to follow though and 
implement the ethical course of action. 
The ECI satisfies the shortcomings left by the ECQ. The ECI has demonstrated a 
reliable factor structure, with confirmatory factor analysis providing evidence of six 
distinct but related factors (Arnaud, 2006). Studies using the ECI have found supporting 
evidence that the steps of the EDM process do exist at the social group level, based on 
aggregation analysis (Arnaud, 2006; Kalshoven, Den Hartog, & De Hoogh, 2013). 
Additionally, the ECI has shown promising predictive validity regarding employee 
ethical behavior (Arnaud, 2010). The author of the ECI found that the total ECI measure 
accounted for 22% of the variance in ethical behavior, which is markedly more than has 
been historically found with the ECQ (Arnaud & Schminke, 2012). Interestingly, only 
three of the six ECI factors (Empathic Concern, Moral Motivation, and Moral Character) 
were found to have significant relationships with ethical behavior; neither of the 
collective moral judgment factors were significant predictors of ethical behavior, which 
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may explain the ECQ’s inconsistent relationship with ethical behavior. As my proposed 
study will utilize ethical climate to predict employee (un)ethical behavior, I will use the 
ECI rather than the more popular ECQ. 
Potential measurement bias in past ethical climate-UPB research. 
There is a possibility that the findings positively correlating ethical climate with 
UPB are due at least in part to the type of ethical climate measure used. Both studies that 
found a positive relationship between ethical climate and UPB (Miao et al., 2013; Verma 
& Mohapatra, 2015) utilized similar ethical climate measures that were adapted from a 
single ethical environment measure (Trevino et al., 1998). These measures prompt 
respondents to rate the amount of ethical and unethical behavior within the respondent’s 
organization and to rate the value placed on ethicality within the organization, but the 
measures do not define ethicality or specify the types of behavior that should be 
considered ethical or unethical. This allows respondents to define for themselves what 
constitutes ethical and unethical behavior for the purposes of rating their organization. 
Theoretically, an individual with extremely high personal ethicality might set a stricter 
ethical standard from which to compare their organization than would an individual 
without high personal ethical standards. This would lead highly ethical individuals to rate 
their organization as having a comparatively low ethical climate, while less ethical 
individuals would rate their organization as having a comparatively high ethical climate. 
These same two studies operationally defined UPB as individual willingness to 
engage in UPB. Theoretically, the highly ethical individuals (who down-rated their 
organization’s ethical climate) might report low willingness to engage in UPB, whereas 
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the less ethical individuals (who up-rated their organization’s ethical environment) would 
report higher willingness to engage in UPB. For this reason, the positive correlation 
found between ethical climate and UPB may be due to differential responding based on 
participants’ personal ethical standards rather than due to a true correlation between the 
constructs. 
This potential flaw present in past research should not affect my proposed study 
for several reasons. First, my proposed ethical climate measure (the ECI) specifies the 
types of behaviors relevant to the measure, therefore creating a standard against which 
the respondents can compare their organization. Furthermore, I hypothesize that the 
direct effect of ethical climate on UPB will be curvilinear rather than linear. If an 
individual’s level of personal ethicality was inversely related to that individual’s ratings 
of department ethical climate, and the individual’s level of ethicality was inversely 
related to their willingness to engage in UPB, this would explain a positive linear 
relationship between ethical climate and UPB, but not a curvilinear one. These 
procedures will eliminate this alternative methodological explanation as a potential threat 
to the conclusion validity of the proposed study. 
Aggregating organizational climate. 
As organizational climate reflects the shared perceptions of employees regarding 
a particular aspect of their work life, it is ideal to analyze organizational climate at the 
group-level. This is typically done by measuring psychological climate at the individual 
level, and after establishing inter-group agreement, aggregating to the desired level. 
Psychological climate refers to an individual employee’s perceptions about a particular 
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aspect of their work environment; psychological climate can apply to any given level 
within the organization, depending on the referent used in the measurement items. For 
example, psychological ethical climate may apply to an employee’s perceptions of their 
personal ethicality at work, “I prioritize ethical considerations at work,” the ethical 
environment of the department, “People in my department prioritize ethical 
considerations,” or the ethical environment of the whole organization “Employees in my 
company prioritize ethical considerations.” The referent used in the measurement items 
determines the appropriate level of aggregation when creating a group-level climate 
score. 
Although both aggregated departmental climate and psychological climate with 
department-level referents have been found to predict individual employee behavior well, 
there is evidence that aggregated department climate generally has a stronger relationship 
with department-level employee behavior (Ostroff, 1993; Schulte, Ostroff, & Kinicki, 
2006; Schulte et al., 2009). Despite this, there are several reasons why a study may 
choose to analyze departmental climate at the psychological climate level. Analyzing 
aggregate organizational climate requires sampling many employees from each 
organization; logistically, this can limit the number of organizations sampled. When 
studying the effects of an organizational climate on a specific outcome, it can be 
beneficial to sample as many different organizations as possible in order increase the 
potential diversity of climate levels observed (Cullen, Victor, & Bronson, 1993).  
Additionally, certain sensitive topics may be difficult to accurately measure 
within an organizational department. Many organizations are reluctant to allow research 
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on uncomplimentary topics such as unethical employee behavior to be conducted on their 
employees (Castille et al., 2016). Furthermore, employees may be hesitant to provide 
honest answers regarding their own unethical workplace behavior if their organization is 
in any way connected to the research. The most effective way to increase participants’ 
confidence in their anonymity is to collect data completely independently from any 
organization and to not require participants to disclose the name of their organization 
(Landers & Behrend, 2015). For these reasons, I will recruit a diverse sample of 
participants, all from different organizations, and measure psychological climate using 
referents at the department level. I will request information about the industry type and 
approximate location of all participants to ensure no unintended nesting occurs in the 
data. 
Individual Differences and UPB 
 Organizational variables are far from the only influences on employee behavior: 
individual differences between employees are another strong predictor of individual 
employee behavior. Furthermore, individual differences between employees can affect 
how those employees react to other variables (Carr, Schmidt, Ford, & DeShon, 2003; 
Hofmann, Morgeson, & Gerras, 2003; Kuenzi & Schminke, 2009). I predict that the two 
individual variables of ethical ideology (Forsyth, 1980) and moral potency (Hannah & 
Avolio, 2010) will moderate the relationship between organizational climate and 
organizational identification predicting UPB. 
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Ethical ideology and UPB. 
 Individuals’ ethical ideology affects the types of considerations that are made 
during moral judgment (the second step in the EDM process). There are thought to be 
two dimensions of ethical ideology: relativism and idealism. Relativism reflects the 
extent to which an individual rejects universal moral rules in favor of determining his or 
her moral decisions on the specific situation at hand. Highly relativistic individuals 
believe that there are no ethical rules that must be followed 100 percent of the time. 
Idealism reflects the extent of an individual’s concern for the welfare of others when 
making moral decisions; highly idealistic individuals believe that there is always a way to 
avoid causing any harm to others when faced with a moral dilemma. Relativism and 
idealism represent two distinct continua that both relate to an individual’s ethical 
ideology; it is possible for an individual to be high or low on both dimensions, and most 
empirical studies have found the two dimensions to be uncorrelated (Barnett, Bass, & 
Brown, 1994; Cadogan, Lee, Tarkiainen, & Sundqvist, 2009; Davis, Andersen, & Curtis, 
2001). 
Multiple meta-analyses (Kish-Gephart et al., 2010; Pan & Sparks, 2012) and a 
literature review (O’Fallon & Butterfield, 2005) have compiled the findings of more than 
50 empirical studies testing the effects of these two dimensions of ethical ideology on 
moral judgments and ethical decision making; all concluded that relativism tends to 
negatively correlate with moral judgments and ethical decision making while idealism 
tends to positively correlate with moral judgments and ethical decision making. 
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The effects of ethical ideology on UPB have only been tested once, but the results 
indicate that relativism and idealism affect individual willingness to engage in UPB in 
much the same way as ethical ideology affects ethical decision making: relativism 
increased UPB intentions, whereas idealism decreased UPB intentions (Verma & 
Mohapatra, 2015). I expect to also find the same effect: relativism will be positively 
related to willingness towards UPB, while idealism will be negatively related to 
willingness towards UPB. 
H5a: Relativism will have a positive effect on individual willingness to engage in 
UPB. 
H5b: Idealism will have a negative effect on individual willingness to engage in 
UPB. 
Furthermore, individuals’ ethical ideology has been found to interact with other 
variables to predict UPB (Verma & Mohapatra, 2015). Idealism was found to negatively 
moderate the relationship between organizational identification and individual 
willingness to engage in UPB, whereas relativism was found to positively moderate the 
relationship between organizational identification and individual willingness to engage in 
UPB. An individual’s ethical ideology influences which criteria receive the most weight 
when making moral judgments; theoretically, this would influence how an individual 
views each argument for or against a possible course of action. For this reason, I predict 
that relativism and idealism will moderate the effect of each of the three variables 
predicting individual willingness to engage in UPB. 
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H6a: Relativism will positively moderate the relationship between ethical climate 
and individual willingness to engage in UPB. 
H6b: Relativism will positively moderate the relationship between goals climate 
and individual willingness to engage in UPB. 
H6c: Relativism will positively moderate the relationship between organizational 
identification and individual willingness to engage in UPB. 
H7a: Idealism will negatively moderate the relationship between ethical climate 
and individual willingness to engage in UPB. 
H7b: Idealism will negatively moderate the relationship between goals climate 
and individual willingness to engage in UPB. 
H7c: Idealism will negatively moderate the relationship between organizational 
identification and individual willingness to engage in UPB. 
Moral potency and UPB. 
Moral potency reflects individual differences in capacity to complete the final two 
stages in the EDM process (choosing to take the ethical choice and following through 
with ethical action). The three dimensions of moral potency are moral ownership (the 
extent to which individuals “feel a sense of psychological responsibility over the ethical 
nature of their own actions”; Hannah, Avolio, & May, 2011, p. 674), moral courage (the 
capacity to “commit to personal moral principles, under conditions where the actor is 
aware of the objective danger involved in supporting those principles, that enables the 
willing endurance of that danger, in order to act ethically or resist pressure to act 
unethically as required to maintain those principles”; Hannah, Avolio, & Walumbwa, 
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2011, p. 560) and moral efficacy (an individual’s sense of confidence in their own 
abilities to produce the ethical outcome, even in the face of opposition). Research using a 
military sample found all three dimensions within moral potency to positively relate to 
soldiers’ commitment to Army values as well as soldiers’ intentions to report others’ 
unethical actions (Schaubroeck et al., 2010). Furthermore, soldiers’ moral courage has 
been found to negatively correlate with past unethical actions (Hannah et al., 2013) and 
positively correlate with ethical and pro-social actions (Hannah et al., 2011). Both moral 
ownership and moral courage were related to how often a soldier would confront his or 
her unit members over ethical transgressions. 
Moral potency predicts individuals’ capacity to commit to engaging in the ethical 
course of action; this suggests that moral potency should negatively relate to individuals’ 
willingness to engage in UPB. 
H8: Moral potency will have a negative effect on individual willingness to engage 
in UPB. 
Furthermore, as moral potency theoretically predicts individuals’ willingness to 
take the ethical course of action despite any opposition or pressure to act unethically 
(Hannah et al., 2011), moral potency should reduce the effect of organizational 
identification and goals climate on UPB. 
H9a: Moral potency will negatively moderate the effect of organizational 
identification on individual willingness to engage in UPB. 
H9b: Moral potency will negatively moderate the effect of goals climate on 
individual willingness to engage in UPB. 
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Departmental UPB and Individual UPB 
It is likely that employees’ individual willingness to engage in UPB will be 
influenced by their perceptions of the overall amount of UPB within their department. 
According to social learning theory, individuals tend to look to the behavior of others 
around them to determine how to behave themselves (Bandura, 1977); likewise, 
employees will decide whether UPB is acceptable in part by observing the normative 
UPB activity within the workplace. Although not included as a specific hypothesis, the 
effect of department-wide UPB on individuals’ willingness towards UPB will be included 
in the model in order to control for this effect. 
See Figure 2 for the proposed study model. 
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Figure 2: Hypothesized Model. 
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CHAPTER II 
METHOD 
 
Sample Selection 
Participants were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). MTurk is 
an online crowdsourcing marketplace that enables individuals of the general public 
(called workers) to complete short-term online services (HITs) for a fee. It also allows 
various entities, called requesters (e.g., marketing companies, political organizations, 
social science researchers) to pay workers to complete HITs. MTurk has been found to be 
valid population sample from which to gather survey data for organizational research 
(Behrend, Sharek, Meade, & Wiebe, 2011; Carter et al., 2014). 
In order to be recruited to participate, workers were required to live in the US and 
have at least a 95% HIT approval rating on MTurk. This was to set basic parameters for 
the sample population and to ensure that the participants have historically provided 
quality responses to previously completed HITs. Workers who met these qualifications 
were able to see the HIT among their available HITs, along with a brief description of the 
HIT, “Take a confidential 30 minute survey about the workplace environment in your 
current or past job, up to 10 years prior to now. You must have been employed for at least 
6 months, for 28 or more hours a week, in an environment that allowed for frequent 
interaction with other employees. Compensation is $3.63.” Assuring confidentiality was 
important in order to help reduce evaluation apprehension, which can be especially 
problematic when studying unfavorable topics such as unethical behavior (Ong & Weiss, 
2000). Furthermore, participants were not required to report on their current organization, 
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to reduce potential unease regarding providing negative information about one’s current 
employer. Participants must have worked in a shared workplace environment for at least 
6 months to ensure that the participant had adequate time to develop a sense of the 
workplace climate; participants must have worked for the company within the last 10 
years to ensure that they will still have an adequate memory of that workplace. 
Compensation for the HIT was determined based on federal minimum wage for 30 
minutes of work. 
Workers that qualified and chose to accept the HIT were provided with a link to 
the survey on Qualtrics. Along with the survey link, participants were presented with a 
message stating that there would be attention checks within the survey, and participants 
that fail the attention checks may be asked to return the HIT without compensation. 
Attention checks take the form of survey questions that blend in with the other survey 
items, but confirm that participants are reading carefully by requesting a specific 
response (i.e., In my department, we are responsible for reading carefully. Choose 
answer four.) It is a common practice on MTurk to use attention checks to screen out and 
deny compensation to inattentive responders (Sheehan & Pittman, 2016). Despite this, the 
evidence for the effectiveness of attention checks in identifying careless responders is 
mixed (Meade & Craig, 2012; Sheehan & Pittman, 2016). Rather than automatically 
screening out and denying compensation to participants who failed attention checks, all 
participants were compensated regardless of their responses to the attention checks. 
Participant responses were later screened for outliers using attention check responses 
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alongside other indicators of response quality, such as response time and Mahalanobis 
distance scores. 
When participants clicked on the survey link, they were first shown an 
information letter that again assured them of their confidentiality, stated that they could 
stop the survey at any time for any reason, and provided the participant with my contact 
information in the event that they had any questions or concerns. After participants 
acknowledged that they had read and agreed to the information letter, they were 
instructed to: Pick a company that you have worked for in the last 10 years, or that you 
currently work for. Make sure to pick a company that employed you for at least 6 months, 
28 or more hours a week, in a workplace environment shared with other employees. We 
will not ask you to name the company that you pick. For the remainder of the survey, 
please respond to the questions based on how they apply to your employment at that 
company.  Participants were then asked demographic questions, followed by scale items; 
the scales were divided into two blocks and the blocks were presented in a random order 
to counterbalance item context effects and ordering effects (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, 
& Podsakoff, 2003). 
Participants 
Of the 410 total responses, ten outliers were identified and removed, leaving a 
usable sample of 400. Age of the participants (when they worked for the target company) 
ranged from 18 to 70 (M = 33.53, SD = 10.22). Years spent at target company ranged 
from 8 months to 39 years (M = 5.38, SD = 4.75). Hours worked a week ranged from 28 
to 65 (M = 40.98, SD = 6.86). The sample had slightly more males (216, 54%) than 
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females (182, 45.5%), with 2 undeclared. Of the 400 participants, two (.5%) did not 
complete high school, 123 (31%) held a high school diploma or GED, 96 (24%) held a 2-
year college degree, 135 (34%) held a 4-year college degree, and 44 (11%) held a 
graduate degree. Fifty-five (13.8%) of the participants’ target companies were not-for-
profit, 339 (84.8%) were for profit, and 6 (1.5%) were undeclared. 
Measures 
Ethical climate. 
 Department ethical climate was measured using the short form of the ECI 
(Arnaud, 2010). The ECI assesses individuals’ perceptions of the ethical climate of their 
department, which is ideal because department-level climate is thought to have a more 
direct influence on individual employee outcomes than organization-level climate 
(Kuenzi & Schminke, 2009).  Arnaud (2010) created this 18-item form of the ECI by 
retaining the three items from each factor with the highest factor loadings. The 
dimensions are Moral Awareness (α = .88), Empathetic Concern (α = .91), Focus on Self 
(α = .92), Focus on Others (α = .87), Moral Motivation (α = .88), and Moral Character (α 
= .83). All but one of the short form dimensions (Empathetic Concern; r = .88) have 
correlations of between .93 – .96 with their corresponding original dimensions. Sample 
items include People around here are aware of ethical issues, In my department it is 
expected that you will always do what is right for society, In my department people are 
willing to break the rules in order to advance in the company, and People in my 
department feel it is better to assume responsibility for a mistake. Response choices range 
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from 1 (Describes my department very well) to 5 (Does not describe my department at 
all). See Appendix A. 
 Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) results from past research have shown that 
the 6-factor structure of the ECI fits the data well (RMSEA = .07, CFI = .97, NFI = .96; 
Arnaud, 2006). Aggregation analysis has shown that the measure is able to reflect 
employees’ shared perceptions of department ethical climate, with median factor within-
group agreement (rwg) ranging from .71 – .85. 
As evidence of convergent validity, ECI scores have been found to be highly to 
moderately correlated with perceived general justice, procedural justice climate, and 
safety climate (Arnaud, 2010). ECI scores are not correlated or only weakly correlated 
with organizational structure, problem solving demand, and perceived functional 
dependence; this demonstrates discriminant validity (Arnaud, 2010). The ECI has also 
displayed criterion validity, explaining 22% of the variance in ethical behavior and 42% 
of the variance in political behavior in the workplace (Arnaud, 2010). 
While CFA results have shown that the ECI is composed of 6 highly-related but 
distinct dimensions (Arnaud, 2006), no previous studies to date have tested the fit of 
combining the sub-scales into a single higher-order factor. Having 6 separate variables 
for ethical climate, however, would greatly complicate the structure of my proposed 
model. I will consider loading the 6 ECI sub-dimensions onto a single second-order 
factor by comparing the harm to model fit with the potential benefits to model parsimony. 
If this approach is unsuccessful, I will test the hypotheses separately with each ECI 
factor. 
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Goals climate. 
Department goals climate perceptions were measured using a 13-item Goals 
Climate Scale adapted from Jiang and Probst’s (2015) Productivity Climate Scale (α = 
.85), which was in turn adapted from a Safety Climate Scale (Neal, Griffin, & Hart, 2000; 
α = .93). 
The original Safety Climate Scale was designed to measure various aspects of 
employees’ workplace environment that contribute to safety climate development, such 
as safety training, communication about safety at work, and an overall emphasis on 
safety. Items were adapted to measure productivity climate by replacing references to 
safety with productivity references; the same process was done for the current study by 
adapting the subject matter of the questions to focus on department goals. The referent 
level used in the safety climate and productivity climate versions had some inconsistency, 
with some items oriented towards individual-level climate and other items oriented 
towards organization-level climate. For use in this study, all items reference department-
level climate. Items from the Productivity Climate Scale include Employees are regularly 
consulted about how best to meet production goals and schedules, and If production 
goals and schedules are not met, I could face negative job-related consequences. Those 
items adapted for the present study read Employees in my department are regularly 
consulted about how best to meet department goals, and If goals in the department are 
not met, employees could face negative job-related consequences. Response options 
range from 1 (Strongly agree) to 5 (Strongly disagree). See Appendix B.  
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The adapted Productivity Climate Scale was found to be highly correlated with 
customer service climate, but uncorrelated with employee safety motivation; higher 
productivity climate was also found to predict a reduction in employee behavioral safety 
compliance (Jiang & Probst, 2015). As this adapted Goals Climate Scale has not been 
previously tested, there is not yet evidence for its convergent, discriminant, or predictive 
validity. 
Organizational identification. 
Organizational identification was measured using Mael and Ashforth’s (1992) 
six-item Organizational Identification scale (α = .92). Items include When I talk about 
this company, I usually say ‘we’ rather than ‘they’, This company’s successes are my 
successes, and When someone criticizes my company, it feels like a personal insult. Item 
responses range from 1 (Strongly agree) to 5 (Strongly disagree). See Appendix C. 
Scores on Organizational Identification have been found to correlate highly with related 
constructs such as satisfaction with one’s organization (Mael & Ashforth, 1992) and 
person-organization fit (Astakhova & Porter, 2015), and to be uncorrelated with unrelated 
variables such as age, gender, and work-unit size (Gils et al., 2015). Additionally, scores 
on Organization Identification has shown to predict job performance (Astakhova & 
Porter, 2015), experienced job responsibility (Hannah et al., 2014), and willingness to 
engage in UPB (Effelsberg et al., 2014; Verma & Mohapatra, 2015). 
Ethical ideology. 
Ethical ideology was measured by the Ethical Position Questionnaire (EPQ; 
Forsyth, 1980). The two dimensions of Idealism (α = .90) and Relativism (α = .87) are 
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measured with 10 items each. Idealism items include If an action could harm an innocent 
other, then it should not be done. Relativism items include What is ethical varies from 
one situation and society to another. Responses are on a scale from 1 (Completely 
disagree) to 9 (Completely agree). See Appendix D.  
Forsyth (1980) recommended dichotomizing and crossing scores on the 
Relativism and Idealism subscales to create a 2x2 taxonomy of ethical ideology styles; 
while some studies have followed this approach (Allmon, Page, & Roberts, 2000; Barnett 
et al., 1994), the majority of research using the EPQ has analyzed Relativism and 
Idealism as two separate continuous variables (Cadogan et al., 2009; Henderson & 
Kaplan, 2005; Henle, Giacalone, & Jurkiewicz, 2005; Kish-Gephart et al., 2010; Moore, 
Detert, Klebe Treviño, Baker, & Mayer, 2012; Verma & Mohapatra, 2015). 
When measured with variables related to moral decision making, the two 
dimensions demonstrated opposite relationships: the Idealism dimension has been found 
to negatively correlate with propensity to morally disengage (Moore et al., 2012), and 
unethical intentions (Kish-Gephart et al., 2010) and positively correlate with ethical 
judgments (Pan & Sparks, 2012), while the Relativism dimension has produced 
correlations of similar strength but in the opposite direction. Despite this, the two 
dimensions have shown differential predictive validity regarding unethical workplace 
behavior: while Idealism was found to negatively predict organizational deviance and 
interpersonal deviance, Relativism showed no significant relationship with these 
variables (Henle et al., 2005). 
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Moral potency. 
Moral potency was measured using the 12-item Moral Potency Questionnaire 
(MPQ) from Hannah and Avolio (2010). The three dimensions within the measure are 
Moral Ownership (3 items, α =.91), Moral Courage (4 items, α =.88), and Moral Efficacy 
(5 items, α =.91). Moral Ownership items include I will assume responsibility to take 
action when I see an unethical act. Moral Courage items include I will confront my peers 
if they commit an unethical act. These two dimensions have a response scale from 1 
(Strongly disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree). Moral Efficacy items include I am confident 
that I can readily see the moral/ethical implications in the challenges I face, answered on 
a scale from 1 (Not at all confident) to 5 (Totally confident). The full scale will not be 
included in the appendices due to the proprietory nature of this measure. See Appendix E 
for more information. The MPQ has also used as as two-factor scale, as some past CFA 
results have shown that a two factor structure combining Moral Ownership and Moral 
Courage fit the data best (SRMR = .03, CFI = .98, NFI = .98; Hannah & Avolio, 2010). 
That study also found that the two remaining first order factors reliability loaded onto a 
single higher-order factor with good model fit. The MPQ overall score, as well as its 
individual dimensions, have been found to be positively correlated with ethical actions 
and intentions to report the unethical actions of others, and to negatively correlate with 
tolerance of the mistreatment of others (Hannah & Avolio, 2010). 
UPB. 
Individual willingness to engage in UPB and department-wide prevalence of UPB 
was measured with the 6-item scale developed by Umphress et al. (2010; α =.89). 
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Although originally designed to reflect an individual’s willingness to perform UPB, the 
items can be adapted slightly to measure the overall frequency of UPB within the 
department. Thus, the 6-item scale was used twice: once in its original form (Individual 
UPB), and once adapted to reflect departmental UPB (Department UPB). Items from 
Individual UPB include If needed, I would conceal information from the public that could 
be damaging to my organization and If it would help my organization, I would 
misrepresent the truth to make my organization look good, measured on a scale from 1 
(Strongly disagree) to 7 (Strongly agree). The adapted Department UPB version of these 
items read How often do people in your department conceal information from the public 
that could be damaging to the organization? and How often do people in your department 
misrepresent the truth to make the organization look good?, measured on a scale from 1 
(Never) to 7 (All the time). See Appendix F for the original UPB scale and Appendix G 
for the adapted Department UPB version. Measuring two constructs at the same time 
point using very similar item structure is likely to lead to increased common method 
variance (Podsakoff et al., 2003); I will test for and statistically control for these effects 
in my analysis. 
Umphress et al. (2010) tested the UPB scale’s construct validity by comparing it 
first to three measures of ethical and extra-role behavior and then to two measures of 
unethical behavior. In both cases, comparative model tests using CFA indicated that the 
factor structure retaining each existing scale as a unique factor was the best fit to the data. 
The UPB measure correlated positively with extra-role behavior, organizational deviance, 
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and interpersonal deviance, but was uncorrelated with interpersonal OCB or 
organizational OCB. 
 Fear tolerance. 
 Engaging in UPB always carries the inherent risk of detection of potential 
punishment; for this reason, it is possible that an individual employee’s level of fear 
tolerance would influence their willingness to engage in UPB. To control for this, we will 
measure participants’ fear tolerance with Norton and Weiss’ (2009) 12-item Courage 
Measure (α = .92). Although the scale was originally conseptualized to measure courage, 
the definition of courage used (“behavioral approach despite the experience of fear”) is 
ideal for the purposes of measuring fear tolerance. For clarity in inturpretation, the 
present study will refer to this scale as Fear Tolerance. Items from Fear Tolerance include 
I will do things even though they seem to be dangerous and If the thought of something 
makes me anxious, I usually will avoid it (Reverse-coded), rated from 1 (Never) to 7 
(Always). See Appendix H.  
Impression management. 
As the present study will be requesting self-report information about participants’ 
unethical behavior, impression management bias is a concern (Podsakoff et al., 2003). 
Thus, I will include the 8-item Impression Management (IM) dimension (α =.80) from 
the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding short form (BIDR-16; Hart, Ritchie, 
Hepper, & Gebauer, 2015). The IM factor captures a participants’ tendency towards 
responding in such a way to appear more socially desirable. Items include Sometimes I 
tell lies if I have to and I have said something bad about a friend behind his or her back 
58 
(reverse-scored), rated from 1 (Not true) to 7 (Very true). See Appendix I. Hart and 
colleagues (2015) demonstrated that the BIDR-16 maintained CFA model fit equivalent 
to the original BIDR, and found that the shorted subscales had high correlations with the 
corresponding original scales (r = .84 for the IM dimension). Furthermore, the shorted 
IM dimension was found to have moderate correlations with other measures of social 
desirability and as well as agreeableness. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
RESULTS 
 
After screening for multivariate outliers in SPSS using Mahalanobis’ distance, 
response time, and attention check responses, the data were imported into the structural 
equation modeling program EQS. Of the 400 usable responses, 28 (7%) had missing data. 
Forty-four data points (.102%) were missing out of a total of 43200 data points. The GLS 
test of homogeneity of means was significant (χ2 = 3023.34, df = 2737, p < .05), which 
indicates that the data are not missing completely at random (MCAR). Missing data were 
computed with maximum likelihood imputation using the expectation maximization 
algorithm. 
Establishing the Final Measurement Model 
 Before evaluating descriptive statistics or testing hypotheses, the measurement 
properties of all scales were evaluated through CFA and the data were tested for method 
effects. The goal at this stage is to ensure that the model-implied relationships between 
items and between scales fit the data well, based on the model Chi-square statistic, root 
mean square residual (RMSEA), and the comparative fit index (CFI). For models with 
high multivariate kurtosis (normalized estimate greater than 10), robust estimates of fit 
were used (Curran & West, 1996). Poor model fit indicates that the survey items do not 
accurately represent their respective constructs, or that the model-implied relationships 
between constructs is inaccurate. Hypothesis testing using a poor fitting model can lead 
to misinterpretation of the results.  
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First, CFAs were conducted on individual scales to make initial adjustments to 
improve model fit including dropping unreliable items, adding error covariances, or 
adjusting factor structure where appropriate. All scales were then included in a single 
model and a CFA was again used to assess model fit and make adjustments where 
appropriate. Method effects were tested, as common method variance can affect data-
implied relationships between constructs and harm fit. After controlling for method 
effects, the measurement properties of all items were again evaluated and problem items 
were dropped. Finally, second order factors were considered for multi-factor scales. The 
final measurement model demonstrated good fit (S-B χ2(2627) = 3302.30, p < .001; CFI 
= .97; RMSEA = .03). See Table 2 for description of each measurement model, Table 3 
for fit statistics for all measurement models, and Table 4 for change in fit statistics 
between relevant measurement models. 
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Subsection Model Name Description
Evaluating Fit of Individual Scales Individual Scales-Original A CFA was conducted on each measure individually (ECI, UPB, 
etc.) to check for fit and factor structure.
Individual Scales-Revised Revised models for each individual scale. Revisions include 
adding justifiable error covariances and cross-loadings, dropping 
unreliable items, and making justifiable changes to factor 
structure.
Evaluating Fit of Combined 
Model
Combined-Original A CFA was conducted on a model that combined the revised 
versions of all substantive measures.
Combined-Revision 1 A revised version of Combined-Original. The only revision was 
the addition of two cross-loadings.
Combined-IM-Original Same as Combined-Original, but with the revised IM scale 
included.
Combined-IM-Revision 1 A revised version of Combined-IM-Original. The same two 
cross-loadings were added as in Combined-Revision 1. Also, 3 
items with low reliability were removed from the IM scale, 
leaving 5 IM items. 2 error covariances involving the dropped 
items were also dropped.
Testing Method Effects Combined-Revision 1-ULMF Same as Combined-Revision 1, but factor loadings are added 
between all substantive items and an unmeasured latent method 
factor to control for common method variance.
Table 2: Overview of Measurement Models.
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Table 2 Continued.
Subsection Model Name Description
Testing Method Effects Continued Combined-IM-Revision 1-Marker Base Same as Combined-IM-Revision 1, but the IM scale is fixed by 
constraining the factor loadings and erorr variances of the IM 
items to their values from Combined-Revision 1-IM and 
constraining all factor covariances between the IM factor and 
other factors to 0.
Combined-IM-Revision 1-Marker Same as Combined-IM-Revision 1-Marker Base, but factor 
loadings are added between the IM factor and all substantive 
items.
Evaluating Fit of Combined 
Model after Controlling Method 
Effects
Combined-Revision 2 Same as Combined-Revision 1, but with items dropped that had 
dimensionality and/or reliability issues. Error covariances and 
cross-loadings involving the dropped items are also dropped.
Combined-Revision 2-ULMF Same as Combined-Revision 2, but factor loadings are added 
between all substantive items and an unmeasured latent method 
factor to control for common method variance.
Combined-IM-Revision 2-Marker Same as Combined-Revision 2, but with the fixed IM factor 
included and loading onto all substantive items to control for 
common method bias.
Testing Second Order Factors Combined-ECI L2 Same as Combined-Revision 2, but the 6 ECI factors are loaded 
onto a single higher-order factor.
Combined-ECI L2-ULMF Same as Combined-ECI L2, but factor loadings are added 
between all substantive items and an unmeasured latent method 
factor to control for common method variance.
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Table 2 Continued.
Subsection Model Name Description
Testing Second Order Factors 
Continued
Combined-IM-ECI L2-Marker Same as Combined-ECI L2, but with the fixed IM factor 
included and loading onto all substantive items to control for 
common method bias.
Combined-MC L2 Same as Combined-Revision 2, but the 2 MC factors are loaded 
onto a single L2 factor.
Combined-MC L2-ULMF Same as Combined-MC L2, but factor loadings are added 
between all substantive items and an unmeasured latent method 
factor to control for common method variance.
Combined-IM-MC L2-Marker Same as Combined-MC L2, but with the fixed IM factor 
included and loading onto all substantive items to control for 
common method bias.
Combined-Goals L2 Same as Combined-Revision 2, but the 2 goals climate factors 
are loaded onto a single L2 factor.
Combined-Goals L2-ULMF Same as Combined-Goals L2, but factor loadings are added 
between all substantive items and an unmeasured latent method 
factor to control for common method variance.
Combined-IM-Goals L2-Marker Same as Combined-Goals L2, but with the fixed IM factor 
included and loading onto all substantive items to control for 
common method bias.
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Table 2 Continued.
Subsection Model Name Description
Final Measurement Model Final Measurement Model Same as Combined-Revision 2, but with the 6 ECI factors 
loaded onto a single L2 factor and with the 2 MC factors loaded 
onto a single L2 factor.
Final Measurement Model-ULMF Same as the Final Measurement Model, but factor loadings are 
added between all substantive items and an unmeasured latent 
method factor to control for common method variance.
Final Measurement Model-IM-Marker Same as the Final Measurement Model, but with the fixed IM 
factor included and loading onto all substantive items to control 
for common method bias.
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Table 3: Fit Statistics for Measurement Models.
Subsection Model Name χ2 S-B χ2 df p CFI RMSEA
ECI-Original 399.64 290.22 137 > .001 .97 .05
ECI-Revised 281.08 205.67 133 > .001 .99 .04
Goals Climate-Original 1242.12 811.53 65 > .001 .69 .17
Goals Climate-Revised 273.32 225.28 57 > .001 .93 .09
Organizational Identification-Original 42.97 29.45 9 .001 .98 .07
Organizational Identification-Revised 38.83 25.42 8 .001 .99 .07
UPB-Original 318.53 202.46 53 > .001 .94 .08
UPB-Revised 202.94 135.20 48 > .001 .96 .07
MPQ-Original 291.72 169.97 51 > .001 .96 .08
MPQ-Revised 145.10 92.213 47 > .001 .98 .05
EPQ-Original 791.31 676.41 169 > .001 .85 .09
EPQ-Revised 128.86 109.12 72 > .001 .98 .04
Fear Tolerance-Original 368.22 292.95 54 > .001 .89 .11
Fear Tolerance-Revised 88.62 69.14 32 > .001 .98 .05
IM-Original 169.63 125.89 20 > .001 .85 .12
IM-Revised 76.74 58.09 18 > .001 .94 .08
Combined-Original 5561.04 4670.52 3419 > .001 .95 .03
Combined-Revision 1 5497.82 4598.30 3417 > .001 .95 .03
Combined-IM-Original 6677.95 5679.29 4109 > .001 .94 .03
Combined-IM-Revision 1 6147.14 5154.48 3836 > .001 .94 .03
Testing Method Effects Combined-Revision 1-ULMF 5055.72 4280.39 3331 > .001 .96 .03
Combined-IM-Revision 1-Marker Base 6320.44 5347.99 3862 > .001 .94 .03
Combined-IM-Revision 1-Marker 6032.42 5081.20 3776 > .001 .94 .03
Combined-Revision 2 3942.17 3281.14 2635 > .001 .97 .03
Combined-IM-Revision 2-Marker Base 4677.05 3936.02 3030 > .001 .96 .03
Combined-Revision 2-ULMF 3622.53 3037.07 2559 > .001 .98 .02
Combined-IM-Revision 2-Marker 4410.85 3694.75 2954 > .001 .96 .03
Note: CFI and RMSEA are robust estimates.
Fit Statistics
Evaluating Fit of Individual 
Scales
Evaluating Fit of Combined 
Model
Evaluating Fit of Combined 
Model after Controlling 
Method Effects
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Table 3 Continued.
Subsection Model Name χ2 S-B χ2 df p CFI RMSEA
Combined-ECI L2 4221.35 3512.10 2693 > .001 .96 .03
Combined-ECI L2-ULMF 3922.26 3277.40 2618 > .001 .97 .03
Combined-IM-ECI L2-Marker 4684.11 3921.75 3012 > .001 .96 .03
Combined-MC L2 3992.08 3321.41 2649 > .001 .97 .03
Combined-MC L2-ULMF 3669.16 3072.00 2571 > .001 .98 .02
Combined-IM-MC L2-Marker 4459.07 3726.95 2966 > .001 .96 .03
Combined-Goals L2 4056.21 3377.52 2649 > .001 .97 .03
Combined-Goals L2-ULMF 3741.42 3139.13 2573 > .001 .97 .02
Combined-IM-Goals L2-Marker 4525.15 3791.62 2968 > .001 .96 .03
Final Measurement Model Final Measurement Model 4254.28 3538.56 2702 > .001 .96 .03
Final Measurement Model-ULMF 3952.91 3302.30 2627 > .001 .97 .03
Final Measurement Model-IM-Marker Base 4989.03 4174.77 3097 > .001 .95 .03
Final Measurement Model-IM-Marker 4714.61 3945.14 3021 > .001 .95 .03
Note: CFI and RMSEA are robust estimates.
Testing Second Order Factors
Fit Statistics
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Table 4: Change in Fit for Measurement Models.
More Restrictive Model Less Restrictive Model Δ χ2 Δ df p value Δ CFI Δ RMSEA
ECI Original ECI Revised 79.71 4 < .001 .014 .016
Goals Climate Original Goals Climate Revised 255.51 8 < .001 .240 .091
Org. Ident. Original Org. Ident. Revised 4.54 1 < .05 .006 .013
UPB Original UPB Revised 50.99 5 < .001 .027 .017
Moral Potency Original Moral Potency Revised 43.20 4 < .001 .027 .027
EPQ Original EPQ Revised 570.24 97 < .001 .137 .051
Fear Tolerance Original Fear Tolerance Revised 229.02 22 < .001 .091 .051
IM Original IM Revised 58.061 2 < .001 .093 .040
Combined Original Combined Revision 1 8.70 2 < .05 .003 .001
Combined Revision 1 Combined Revision 2 1322.91 782 < .001 .019 .005
Combined Original-Marker Measurement Combined Revision 1-Marker Measurement 564.31 273 < .001 .006 .001
Combined Revision 1-Marker Base Combined Revision 2-Marker Base 1418.67 832 < .001 .016 .004
Combined Original Final Measurement 1139.32 717 < .001 .013 .003
Combined Revision 1 Combined Revision 1-ULMC 251.67 86 < .001 .011 .004
Combined Revision 1-Marker Base Combined Revision 1-Marker 310.95 86 < .001 .005 .002
Combined Revision 2 Combined Revision 2-ULMC 213.93 76 < .001 .008 .003
Combined Revision 2-Marker Base Combined Revision 2-Marker 273.68 76 < .001 .008 .002
Final Measurement Final Measurement-ULMF 217.44 76 < .001 .008 .003
Final Measurement-IM-Marker Base Final Measurement-IM-Marker 229.63 76 < .001 .008 .002
Note: Change in χ2 is Scaled S-B; change in CFI and RMSEA are robust estimates.
Change in Fit
Individual Scales
Measurement Model Revisions
Method Effects Testing
68 
Table 4 Continued.
More Restrictive Model Less Restrictive Model Δ χ2 Δ df p value Δ CFI Δ RMSEA
Combined Revision 2 ECI L2 Combined Revision 2 228.12 59 < .001 .008 .003
Combined Revision 2 ECI L2-ULMC Combined Revision 2-ULMC 218.82 59 < .001 .008 .003
Combined Revision 2 ECI L2-Marker Combined Revision 2-Marker 223.29 59 < .001 .008 .003
Combined Revision 2 MP L2 Combined Revision 2 38.74 14 < .001 .001 .000
Combined Revision 2 MP L2-ULMC Combined Revision 2-ULMC 30.30 14 < .01 .001 .000
Combined Revision 2 MP L2-Marker Combined Revision 2-Marker 26.17 14 < .05 .001 .000
Combined Revision 2 Goals Climate L2 Combined Revision 2 103.39 14 < .001 .004 .001
Combined Revision 2 Goals Climate L2-
ULMC
Combined Revision 2-ULMC 115.85 14 < .001 .004 .001
Combined Revision 2 Goals Climate L2-
Marker
Combined Revision 2-Marker 102.18 14 < .001 .004 .001
Note: Change in χ2 is Scaled S-B; change in CFI and RMSEA are robust estimates.
Second Order Factor Testing
Model Comparisons Change in Fit
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Evaluating fit of individual scales. 
 Individual Scales-Original. 
Fit and factor structure were first modeled separately for each substantive 
measure and for the measured method variable IM using CFA. For each measure, all 
items were loaded onto their respective latent factors and all factors were allowed to 
covary. The measurement properties of the factors and their indicators were evaluated 
based on the Chi-square statistic, CFI, RMSEA, factor loadings and factor correlations. 
Individual Scales-Revised. 
After modeling each measure using the original factor structure, the Lagrange 
Multiplier (LM) test was used to identify sources of misfit. Item cross-loadings and error 
covariances that would significantly improve model fit were considered, provided there 
was a theoretical basis for including the additional parameters. Between the 102 total 
items making up the eight measured scales, a total of 27 error covariances and four cross-
loadings were added3. Eight items with factor loadings under .6 were dropped at this 
stage due to their low reliability. Items with dimensionality issues (multiple cross-
loadings or error covariances) were retained and were reconsidered for removal after 
controlling for method effects. 
Goals Climate Scale factor structure. 
When modeling the Goals Climate Scale, poor fit (S-B χ2(65) = 811.53, p < .001; 
CFI = .69; RMSEA = .17) and the pattern of error covariances identified by the LM test 
                                                          
3 Error covariances were justified based on similarities in item wording or subject matter, and cross-
loadings were added based on substantive item overlap between factor constructs. Many of these cross-
loadings and error covariances were dropped in later models after items with dimensionality issues were 
dropped. 
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indicated a need to revise factor structure. The thirteen item measure was expected to 
contain a single factor because it was adapted from a single-factor Productivity Climate 
Scale (Jiang & Probst, 2015) which in turn had been adapted from a single-factor Safety 
Climate Scale (Neal et al., 2000). The single-factor structure of the Safety Climate Scale 
had demonstrated good fit, but the factor structure of the Productivity Climate Scale had 
not been rigorously tested: a CFA conducted by Jiang and Probst (2015) indicated a 
single factor, but this CFA had used three item parcels rather than the thirteen individual 
items due to concerns over small sample size. 
For the current study, the pattern of error covariances revealed by the LM test on 
the Goals Climate Scale-Original model indicated a two-factor structure; one factor 
contained items related to compelling employees to pursue department goals through 
management pressure and established consequences (If goals in the department are not 
met, employees could face negative job-related consequences; The main focus in my 
department is on meeting goals. Everything else is secondary) and one factor contained 
items related to empowering employees to work towards departmental goals by getting 
employees involved in goals achievement strategies (Employees in my department are 
able to discuss goal achievement issues in meetings) and training employees to be better 
equipped to achieve department goals (Employees in my department receive 
comprehensive training regarding how best to meet their goals). The new two-factor 
structure significantly improved the fit of the scale over the original factor structure 
(Scaled Δ S-B χ2(8) = 255.51, p < .001; Δ CFI = .24; Δ RMSEA = .09). Also, based on 
the content of the items, it is reasonable to argue that the two factors capture two distinct 
71 
aspects of goals climate, which I will refer to as pressuring goals climate and 
empowering goals climate. The subscales to measure these two goals climate dimensions 
will be called Goals Pressure and Goals Empowerment. See Table 5 for details on the 
factor restructuring. 
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Table 5: Factor Restructoring of Goals Climate Scale.
Goals Pressure Goals Empowerment
1 Management in my department places a strong emphasis on 
meeting goals.
1 There is frequent communication about issues related to meeting 
goals in my department.
2 The achieving of goals drives most decisions at my department. 2 Employees in my department are able to discuss goal 
achievement issues in meetings.
3 Meeting goals is a top priority of the management in my 
department.
3 Employees in my department are regularly consulted about how 
best to meet department goals.  
4 The main focus in my department is on meeting goals. 
Everything else is secondary.
4 How to meet department goals is given high priority in training 
programs for employees in my department.
5 Performance evaluations for employees in my department are 
primarily based on whether employees did their part to help the 
company meet goals.
5 Employees in my department receive comprehensive training 
regarding how best to meet their goals.
6 If goals in the department are not met, employees could face 
negative job-related consequences.
6 Training programs for employees in my department primarily 
focus on how to achieve goals.
7 Management in my department praises employees that help the 
company meet goals.
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MPQ factor structure. 
Although the MPQ demonstrated good fit (S-B χ2(51) = 169.97, p < .001; CFI = 
.96; RMSEA = .08) with the original three factor structure, the very high factor 
correlation between the Moral Ownership and Moral Courage factors (r = .93, p < .001) 
indicated potential problems with discriminant validity (Brown, 2006). This same 
problem had been observed in past studies, and the authors of the scale concluded that the 
two factors in question were similar enough that it was justifiable to combine them into a 
single factor (Hannah & Avolio, 2010). Thus, for this study we combined the Moral 
Ownership and Moral Courage factors into a single Moral Ownership & Courage factor, 
leaving the MPQ scale with two factors. 
Evaluating fit of combined model. 
Combined-Original. 
After the revisions were made to the individual scales, all substantive scales were 
included in a single model and overall model fit was reexamined. As the IM scale will be 
used as a method factor in certain subsequent models but not in others, there were two 
versions of the original measurement model with all scales combined: one without the IM 
scale (Combined-Original; S-B χ2(3419) = 4670.52, p < .001; CFI = .95; RMSEA = .03) 
and one with the IM scale (Combined-IM-Original; S-B χ2(4109) = 5679.29, p < .001; 
CFI = .94; RMSEA = .03). 
Combined-Revision 1. 
The LM test was used to identify sources model misfit in the Combined-Original 
and Combined-IM-Original models, this time between items of separate measures. Two 
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between-scale cross-loadings were added to Combined-Original, creating Combined-
Revision 1. The revisions significantly improved model fit, (Scaled Δ S-B χ2(2) = 8.70, p 
< .05; Δ CFI = .003; Δ RMSEA = .001). The same two cross-loadings were added to 
Combined-IM-Original. Also, three IM items were removed as they were found to have 
low reliability within the context of the combined model. Two error covariances 
involving the dropped items were also dropped. These changes created model Combined-
IM-Revision 1, which had significantly improved model fit compared to Combined-IM-
Original, (Scaled Δ S-B χ2(273) = 564.31, p < .001; Δ CFI = .01; Δ RMSEA = .001). 
Testing method effects. 
This study was susceptible to possible method effects for many reasons. First, 
because the survey is self-report, taken at a single time point, and comprised 
predominately of Likert-scale items, common method variance is a serious concern 
(Podsakoff et al., 2003). Furthermore, the sensitive topic of unethical pro-organizational 
behavior and even organizational ethical climate raise the possibility of common method 
bias attributable to impression management. Although the study assured participants of 
their confidentiality to reduce evaluation apprehension and used a counterbalanced 
survey design to reduce item context effects, these procedures alone are unlikely to be 
sufficient in controlling for all possible method effects. In order to test for and control 
potential method effects, two statistical techniques were also used: an unmeasured latent 
method factor (ULMF) and the CFA marker variable technique (Podsakoff et al., 2003). 
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Combined-Revision 1-ULMF. 
To test for common method variance, an unmeasured latent method factor was 
added to model Combined-Revision 1 to create model Combined-Revision 1-ULMF. All 
items were allowed to load onto their respective substantive factors as well as to the 
unmeasured latent method factor, and all substantive factors were allowed to covary. 
Factor correlations between substantive factors and the unmeasured latent method were 
constrained to be zero for statistical identification purposes (Williams & Hartman, 2010). 
The addition of the unmeasured latent method factor significantly improved the model fit 
of Combined-Revision 1-ULMF compared to Combined-Revision 1 (Scaled Δ S-B χ2(86) 
= 251.67, p < .001; Δ CFI = .01; Δ RMSEA = .004), indicating the presence of common 
method variance. Based on this evidence, hypothesis testing will be conducted with and 
without the unmeasured latent method factor to ensure that any significant findings 
cannot be explained by common method variance.  
Combined-IM-Revision 1-Marker. 
The CFA marker technique was used to test for common method bias due to 
impression management (Williams & O’Boyle, 2015). In order to keep the interpretation 
of the IM method factor constant across all subsequent tests for common method bias, the 
IM factor loadings and error variances were fixed to their observed values in Combined-
IM-Revision 1. This is necessary before loading all substantive items onto the IM factor 
in order to ensure that the marker variable only extracts shared variance related to 
impression management from the substantive items. In other words, the IM method factor 
extracts the meaning of the impression management construct from the measured IM 
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items and then is able to extract shared variance caused by impression management from 
the substantive items. Correlations between substantive latent factors and the IM factor 
were constrained to zero in order for the subsequent models to be properly statistically 
identified. These steps established a baseline model (Combined-IM-Revision 1-Marker 
Base) to serve as a benchmark comparison against the subsequent tests of common 
method bias. 
After the model Combined-IM-Revision 1-Marker Base was established, IM 
method factor loadings were added to each substantive item, creating the model 
Combined-IM-Revision 1-Marker. Adding the method factor loadings to the substantive 
items significantly improved the model fit of Combined-IM-Revision 1-Marker compared 
to Combined-IM-Revision 1-Marker Base (Scaled Δ S-B χ2(86) = 310.95, p < .001; Δ CFI 
= .01; Δ RMSEA = .002), indicating the presence of common method bias due to 
impression management. Based on these results, hypothesis testing will be conducted 
with and without the IM marker variable to ensure that any significant findings cannot be 
explained by common method bias. 
Evaluating fit of combined model after controlling method effects. 
 Combined-Revision 2. 
All items were again examined based on their measurement properties before and 
after controlling for method effects, using models Combined-Revision 1, Combined-
Revision 1-ULMF, and Combined-IM-Revision 1-Marker. Within these three models, 
items were evaluated based on their substantive factor loadings, method factor loadings, 
cross-loadings, and error covariances. Considering all of these measurement properties, 
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problem items were identified and dropped. An additional 10 items were dropped from 
all model versions, which allowed for the removal of five cross-loadings and eight error 
covariances. These changes resulted in models Combined-Revision 2, Combined-Revision 
2-ULMF, and Combined-IM-Revision 2-Marker. The revisions significantly improved 
model fit: Combined-Revision 2 compared to Combined-Revision 1 (Scaled Δ S-B 
χ2(782) = 1322.91, p < .001; Δ CFI = .02; Δ RMSEA = .01), Combined-Revision 2-
ULMC compared to Combined-Revision 1-ULMC (Scaled Δ S-B χ2(772) = 1254.36, p < 
.001; Δ CFI = .02; Δ RMSEA = .004), and Combined-IM-Revision 2-Marker compared to 
Combined-IM-Revision 1-Marker (Scaled Δ S-B χ2(822) = 1393.77, p < .001; Δ CFI = 
.02; Δ RMSEA = .004). See Table 6 for a list of all dropped items, with explanations for 
each. 
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Table 6: List of Dropped Items.
Item Item Text Explanation
Goals Climate
Goals Pressure-4 The main focus in my department is on meeting goals. 
Everything else is secondary.
This item had multidimensionality issues as evidenced by 
an error covariance and the between-scale cross-loading, 
and controlling for method effects did not help to reduce 
the multidimensionality issues.
Goals Pressure-5 Performance evaluations for employees in my 
department are primarily based on whether employees 
did their part to help the company meet goals.
This item had both poor reliability (Item loading = .50) and 
multidimensionality issues as shown by a cross-loading and 
error covariance.
Goals Pressure-6 If goals in the department are not met, employees 
could face negative job-related consequences.
This item had low reliability (Item loading = .51) and 
dimensionality issues based on its error covariance.
Goals Empowerment-1 There is frequent communication about issues related 
to meeting goals in my department.
This item had both poor reliability (Item loading = .44) and 
multidimensionality issues as shown by its cross-loading.
Goals Empowerment-5 Employees in my department receive comprehensive 
training regarding how best to meet their goals.
This item had measurement issues as evidenced by its 
multiple error covariances. It also had dimensionality issues 
with other scales that were not controled for because there 
was no reasonable theoretical rationale for adding any cross-
loadings.
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Table 6 Continued.
Item Item Text Explanation
EPQ Scale
Idealism-7 Deciding whether or not to perform an act by 
balancing the positive consequences of the act against 
the negative consequences of the act is immoral.
Low Reliability (Item loading = .329)
Idealism-9 It is never necessary to sacrifice the welfare of others. Low Reliability (Item loading = .555)
Idealism-10 Moral actions are those which closely match the 
ideals of the most “perfect” action.   
Low Reliability (Item loading = .390)
Relativism-1 There are no ethical principles that are so important 
that they should be part of any code of ethics.
Low Reliability (Item loading = .377)
Relativism-9 No rule concerning lying can be formulated; whether 
a lie is permissible or not permissible totally depends 
on the situation.
Low Reliability (Item loading = .515)
Relativism-10 Whether a lie is judged to be moral or immoral 
depends on the circumstances surrounding the action.
Low Reliability (Item loading = .471)
MPQ Scale
Moral Efficacy-1 I am confident that I can confront others who behave 
unethically to resolve the issue.
This item had both poor reliability (Item loading = .42) and 
multidimensionality issues as shown by a between-scale 
cross-loading.
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Table 6 Continued.
Item Item Text Explanation
UPB Scale
Individual UPB-4 If my organization needed me to, I would give a good 
recommendation on the behalf of an incompetent 
employee in the hope that the person will become 
another organization’s problem instead of my own.
This item had dimensionality issues based on its between-
factor error covariance.
Individual UPB-5 If my organization needed me to, I would withhold 
issuing a refund to a customer or client accidentally 
overcharged.
This item had low reliability (Item loading = .52) and 
dimensionality issues based on its between-factor error 
covariance.
Department UPB-4 Employees in my company have given a good 
recommendation on the behalf of an incompetent 
employee in the hope that the person will become 
another organization’s problem.
This item had low reliability based on its low factor loading 
(Item loading = .54) and dimensionality issues based on its 
cross-factor error covariance.
Department UPB-5 Employees in my department have withheld issuing a 
refund to a customer or client accidentally 
overcharged.
This item had low reliability (Item loading = .53) and 
dimensionality issues based on its between-factor error 
covariance.
Fear Tolerance Scale
Fear Tolerance-7 I will do things even though they seem to be 
dangerous.
Low Reliability (Item loading = .465)
Fear Tolerance-12 I will not face something I fear, even if avoiding it 
will have a negative outcome for me.
Low Reliability (Item loading = .457)
81 
Table 6 Continued.
Item Item Text Explanation
IM Scale
Impression Management-5 I have said something bad about a friend behind his or 
her back.
Low Reliability (Item loading = .442)
Impression Management-6 When I hear people talking privately, I avoid 
listening.
Low Reliability (Item loading = .459)
Impression Management-8 I don’t gossip about other people’s business. Low Reliability (Item loading = .460)
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Testing second order factors. 
Next, second order factors were considered for the ECI, MPQ, and the Goals 
Climate Scale. For each, the overall model fit was examined before and after creating a 
second order factor. Other issues were also considered, such as theoretical justification, 
second order factor loadings, and the potential improvements to model parsimony. 
ECI. 
The factors within the ECI were formulated to capture collective ethical climate 
perceptions as they relate to each of the components of Rest’s (1986) model for ethical 
decision making. Rest’s theory states that each of the ethical decision making steps are 
reflected in the final ethical decision; the authors of the ECI use this logic to argue that 
conceptually, the six ECI factors are all highly related but distinct dimensions of ethical 
climate which together explain the overall ethical climate construct (Arnaud, 2010). This 
is theoretical justification for use of a second order ECI factor. 
Several past empirical studies have also found the six ECI factors to be highly 
intercorrelated, although no previous studies were found that have used the ECI as a 
single second order factor. The ECI factor intercorrelations in the present study were also 
found to be high (M = .74, SD = .10), and were not reduced by controlling for method 
effects with the unmeasured latent method factor or marker variable (M = .74, SD = .10). 
For this study, the use of a second order factor for the ECI would greatly improve model 
parsimony and would make the interpretation of hypothesis testing results much simpler. 
By reducing the number of required factor covariances, a second order ECI factor would 
result in a net increase of 59 degrees of freedom for the measurement model. A second 
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order ECI factor would also reduce the number of exogenous variables in the overall 
model by five, and reduce the number of hypotheses to test by thirty-five4. Creating a 
second order ECI factor did harm the fit of the overall model (Scaled Δ S-B χ2(59) = 
228.12, p < .001). The robust CFI indicated a trivial harm in overall fit (Δ CFI = .008); 
changes of over .01 in CFI are considered to be significant (Marsh, Hau, & Wen, 2004). 
The ECI second order factor loadings were all well within the acceptable range (γ = .77 – 
.98), indicating good reliability of the first order factors in representing the second order 
factor. It was determined that the slight reduction in overall fit caused by creating a 
second order ECI factor was justifiable considering the benefits to parsimony and the 
demonstrated reliabilities of the first order factors. 
MPQ. 
Past research has provided theoretical and statistical justification that the 
individual factors within the MPQ are all elements of an overall moral potency construct 
(Hannah & Avolio, 2010). This past research used the MPQ as a single second order 
factor and demonstrated that this factor structure fit the data well. The data from the 
present study shows the Moral Ownership & Courage and the Moral Efficacy factor to be 
highly correlated (r = .77, p < .001). Creating a second order MPQ factor results in a net 
increase of 14 degrees of freedom for the measurement model, reduces the number of 
exogenous factors by one, and reduces the number of hypotheses to test by three. The two 
first order MPQ factors both loaded reliably onto the second order factor (γ = .86; γ = 
.89). The creation of the second order MPQ factor did significantly harm the fit of the 
                                                          
4 Without the second order ECI factor, the seven hypotheses involving the ECI would each have to be 
conducted six times. 
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overall model (Scaled Δ S-B χ2(14) = 38.74, p < .001), although harm to fit was reduced 
when controlling for method effects with the unmeasured latent method factor (S-B 
χ2(14) = 30.30, p < .01) and with the marker variable (S-B χ2(14) = 26.17, p < .05). 
Reductions in robust CFI (Δ CFI = .001) indicated a trivial amount of harm to overall fit. 
Based on these justifications, the two MPQ first order factors were combined into a 
second order factor for use in the structural model. 
Goals Climate Scale. 
The Goals Climate Scale was expected to be a single factor, but the factor 
structure was adapted after CFA results indicated that the scale contained two distinct but 
correlated factors. It is possible that the two first order goals climate factors could operate 
as a single second order factor, but there is limited information to use as justification. The 
goals climate scale was adapted from a productivity climate scale which in turn was 
adapted from a safety climate scale, and the current variation has never been used before. 
The Goals Pressure and Goals Empowerment factors were found to be moderately 
correlated (r = .65, p < .001). The use of a second order Goals Climate factor would 
result in a net increase of 14 degrees of freedom for the measurement model, reduce 
exogenous variables by one, and reduce the number of hypotheses to test by seven. The 
two first order Goals Climate factors both loaded reliably onto the second order factor (γ 
= .76; γ = .84). The creation of the second order goals climate factor did significantly 
harmed the fit of the overall model (Scaled Δ S-B χ2(14) = 103.39, p < .001) although the 
harm to the robust CFI was trivial (Δ CFI = .004). The harm to fit relative to increased 
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degrees of freedom was more severe for the second order Goals Climate than for the 
second order ECI or the second order MPQ. 
Based on the lack of theoretical justification and the statistical evidence against a 
second order factor, Goals Climate will not be used as a second order factor; instead, the 
hypotheses involving Goals Climate will each be tested independently for Goals Pressure 
and for Goals Empowerment. This will affect seven hypotheses: H3a (goals climate 
predicting individual UPB), H3b (goals climate predicting department UPB), H4a (ethical 
climate*goals climate predicting individual UPB), H4b (ethical climate*goals climate 
predicting department UPB), H6b (relativism*goals climate predicting individual UPB), 
H7b (idealism*goals climates predicting individual UPB), and H9b (moral potency*goals 
climate predicting individual UPB). Each will be split into versions one and two (e.g. 
H4a-1 and H4a-2), with version one using Goals Pressure and version two using Goals 
Empowerment. 
Final Measurement Model. 
The Final Measurement Model is the same as the Combined-Revision 2 model, 
but with the six ECI factors loaded onto a single second order factor and the two MPQ 
factors loaded onto a second order factor. The Final Measurement Model has 81 items, 
16 first order factors, and two second order factors. Out of the original 102 items, 18 
substantive items and three marker indicator items were dropped, 17 error covariances 
were added, and one cross-loading was added. The Final Measurement Model 
demonstrates good fit (S-B χ2(2702) = 3538.56, p < .001 CFI = .96, RMSEA = .03) and 
significantly improved fit over the original model, (Scaled Δ S-B χ2(717)= 1139.32, p < 
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.001; Δ CFI = .01, Δ RMSEA = .003). Additionally, two techniques for controlling 
method effects significantly improved the fit compared to the baseline: an unmeasured 
latent method factor (Final Measurement Model-ULMF; Scaled Δ S-B χ2(76) = 217, p < 
.001; Δ CFI = .01, Δ RMSEA = .003) and the CFA marker variable technique (Final 
Measurement Model-IM-Marker; Scaled Δ S-B χ2(76) = 229.63, p < .001; Δ CFI = .01, Δ 
RMSEA = .002). The subsequent structural models used for hypothesis testing will each 
be conducted three times, once with the unmeasured latent method factor, once with the 
marker variable, and once without controlling for method effects. See Table 7 for means, 
SDs, composite reliabilities, and correlations for all measures. 
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Table 7: Means, SDs, Composite Reliabilities, and Correlations.
Mean SD ECI Org Idt. UPB D. UPB Idealism Relativ. MPQ Goals P. Goals E. Fear Tol.
ECI 5.90 1.70 .94 (.72)
Org Ident. 4.10 1.68 .58*** .92 (.82)
UPB 2.41 1.33 -.18*** .20*** .88 (.81)
Dept. UPB 3.02 1.53 -.62*** -.26*** .37*** .90 (.83)
Idealism 7.26 1.59 .15** .12* -.35*** -.09 .92 (.78)
Relativism 4.99 1.75 .00 .00 .11* .05 -.07 .88 (.72)
MPQ 6.63 1.55 .46*** .30*** -.47*** -.38*** .45*** -.11* .94 (.72)
Goals Pres. 5.77 1.27 .14* .04 -.13* -.03 .26*** -.03 .26*** .93 (.91)
Goals Emp. 5.03 1.39 .59*** .35*** -.08 -.29*** .21*** -.02 .41*** .65*** .87 (.76)
Fear Tol. 4.72 1.21 .30*** .21*** -.26*** -.22*** .13* -.06 .65*** .21*** .24*** .92 (.74)
Note: Correlations are before controlling for method effects. p < .05*, p < .01**, p < .001***
Factor composite reliabilities (Rho) are on the diagonal, with square root of AVE in parentheses.
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Structural Models 
 The complete structural model was built in stages, with the majority of hypothesis 
testing occurring in the Final Model. First, hypothesized main effects were added to the 
Final Measurement Model, creating the model Main Effects-Original. Next, additional 
unhypothesized main effects were added as indicated by the LM test, creating the model 
Main Effects-Revised. Then, hypothesized multiplicative effects (interactions and 
quadratic effects) were assessed by adding one multiplicative effect at a time to the Main 
Effects-Revised model. This created a series of Individual Multiplicative Effects models, 
each including one hypothesized multiplicative effect. Multiplicative effects with 
nonsignificant parameter estimates in the Individual Multiplicative Effects models were 
considered not supported and were not tested further. The four hypothesized 
multiplicative effects with significant parameter estimates were then all added to the 
Main Effects-Revised model and tested together in the model Cumulative Multiplicative 
Effects. The three multiplicative effects that remained significant in the Cumulative 
Multiplicative Effects model were included in the Final Model. Due to extreme levels of 
multivariate kurtosis, composite multiplicative factors were used for multiplicative 
effects involving the ECI in models Cumulative Multiplicative Effects and Final Model.  
Hypothesized main effects with significant parameter estimates in the Final 
Model were considered supported. Hypothesized multiplicative effects had to 
demonstrate significant parameter estimates in the Individual Multiplicative Effects 
models, the Cumulative Multiplicative Effects model, and the Final Model to be 
considered supported. See Table 8 for an overview of all structural models, Table 9 for fit 
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statistics for all structural models, and Table 10 for comparisons in model fit between 
relevant structural models.  
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Table 8: Overview of Structural Models.
Subsection Model Name Description
Establishing Main Effects Main Effects-Original Final Measurement, but with structural paths added for 
hypothesized main effects. Linear paths also added to 
prepare for hypothesized quadratic effects. All factor 
covariances are removed (constrained to zero) for the 3 
newly endogenous dependent variables.
Main Effects-Original-ULMF Same as the Main Effects-Original, but factor loadings 
are added between all substantive items and an 
unmeasured latent method factor to control for common 
method variance.
Main Effects-IM-Original-Marker Same as the Main Effects-Original, but with the fixed IM 
factor included and loading onto all substantive items to 
control for common method bias.
Main Effects-Revised Revised version of Main Effects-Original. 5 additional 
linear main effect paths were added based on those 
indicated by the LM test.
Main Effects-Revised-ULMF Same as the Main Effects-Revised, but factor loadings are 
added between all substantive items and an unmeasured 
latent method factor to control for common method 
variance.
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Table 8 Continued.
Subsection Model Name Description
Establishing Main Effects Continued Main Effects-IM-Revised-Marker Same as the Main Effects-Revised, but with the fixed IM 
factor included and loading onto all substantive items to 
control for common method bias.
Testing Multiplicative Effects Individual Multiplicative Effects Same as the Main Effects-Revised, but with 1 
multiplicative latent variable included to test 1 
hypothesized interaction or quadratic effect. This is 
conducted for each of the hypothesized interactions and 
quadratic effects. 
Individual Multiplicative Effects-ULMF Each individual multiplicative effect is also tested with 
factor loadings added between all substantive items and 
an unmeasured latent method factor to control for 
common method variance.
Individual Multiplicative Effects-IM-
Marker
Each individual multiplicative effect is tested, but with 
the fixed IM factor included and loading onto all 
substantive items to control for common method bias.
Cumulative Multiplicative Effects The 4 supported hypotheses from the Individual 
Multiplicative Effects models are tested together in 1 
model, but the 2 multiplicative effects involving the ECI 
are first converted to composites.
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Table 8 Continued.
Subsection Model Name Description
Testing Multiplicative Effects Continued Cumulative Multiplicative Effects-
ULMF
Same as Cumulative Multiplicative Effects, but factor 
loadings are added between all substantive items and an 
unmeasured latent method factor to control for common 
method variance.
Cumulative Multiplicative Effects-IM-
Marker
Same as Cumulative Multiplicative Effects, but with the 
fixed IM factor included and loading onto all substantive 
items to control for common method bias.
Final Model Final Model The 3 multiplicative effects that were supported in the 
Cumulative Multiplicative Effects model are tested 
together in 1 model.
Final Model-ULMF Same as Final Model, but factor loadings are added 
between all substantive items and an unmeasured latent 
method factor to control for common method variance.
Final Model-IM-Marker Same as Final Model, but with the fixed IM factor 
included and loading onto all substantive items to control 
for common method bias.
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Table 9: Fit of Structural Models.
Phase Model χ2 S-B χ2 df p CFI RMSEA
Main Effects Testing Main Effects-Original 4274.75 3557.37 2713 > .001 .96 .028
Main Effects-Original-ULMF 3991.64 3333.60 2642 > .001 .97 .027
Main Effects-IM-Original-Marker 4725.01 3954.76 3031 > .001 .95 .028
Main Effects-Revised 4167.86 3469.26 2708 > .001 .96 .025
Main Effects-Revised-ULMF 3939.29 3290.75 2637 > .001 .97 .025
Main Effects-IM-Revised-Marker 4624.20 3872.69 3026 > .001 .96 .026
Individual Multiplicative Effects Individual Multiplicative Effect-H1a 7677.24 6213.00 4201 > .001 .91 .035
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H1a-ULMF 7230.20 5897.37 4108 > .001 .92 .033
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H1a-IM-Marker 8214.83 6882.00 4592 > .001 .91 .033
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H1b 7686.77 6220.17 4201 > .001 .91 .035
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H1b-ULMF 7241.02 5905.58 4108 > .001 .92 .033
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H1b-IM-Marker 8224.34 6892.51 4592 > .001 .91 .034
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H4a-1 7487.07 5554.21 4197 > .001 .92 .028
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H4a-1-ULMF 7218.76 5354.84 4108 > .001 .92 .028
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H4a-1-IM-Marker 8063.52 6199.60 4592 > .001 .92 .028
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H4a-2 7710.15 5887.29 4200 > .001 .91 .032
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H4a-2-ULMF 7068.17 5463.76 4108 > .001 .93 .029
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H4a-2-IM-Marker 8278.45 6674.04 4592 > .001 .91 .032
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H4b-1 7498.11 5566.95 4197 > .001 .92 .029
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H4b-1-ULMF 7229.03 5366.04 4108 > .001 .93 .031
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H4b-1-IM-Marker 8071.27 6204.42 4592 > .001 .92 .028
Note: CFI and RMSEA are robust estimates.
Fit Statistics
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Table 9 Continued.
Phase Model χ2 S-B χ2 df p CFI RMSEA
Individual Multiplicative Effects Individual Multiplicative Effect-H4b-2 7710.06 5887.04 4200 > .001 .91 .032
Continued Individual Multiplicative Effect-H4b-2-ULMF 7068.14 5463.29 4108 > .001 .93 .029
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H4b-2-IM-Marker 8278.43 6673.56 4592 > .001 .91 .032
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H6a 7751.83 6307.20 4197 > .001 .91 .034
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H6a-ULMF 7038.60 5587.96 4108 > .001 .94 .030
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H6a-IM-Marker 8312.33 6861.70 4592 > .001 .91 .033
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H6b-1 4488.71 3723.35 2928 > .001 .96 .026
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H6b-1-ULMF 4255.53 3541.98 2854 > .001 .97 .025
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H6b-1-IM-Marker 5001.71 4175.20 3263 > .001 .95 .026
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H6b-2 4518.49 3745.26 2928 > .001 .96 .026
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H6b-2-ULMF 4276.45 3563.88 2854 > .001 .97 .025
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H6b-2-IM-Marker 5009.19 4179.46 3263 > .001 .95 .027
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H6c 4530.98 3778.64 2928 > .001 .96 .027
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H6c-ULMF 4297.15 3598.96 2854 > .001 .96 .026
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H6c-IM-Marker 5032.38 4223.46 3263 > .001 .95 .027
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H7a 7606.00 5658.78 4197 > .001 .93 .030
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H7a-ULMF 7135.92 5367.07 4108 > .001 .94 .028
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H7a-IM-Marker 8169.07 6400.22 4592 > .001 .93 .029
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H7b-1 4544.48 3802.02 2928 > .001 .96 .026
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H7b-1-ULMF 4313.87 3569.44 2854 > .001 .97 .025
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H7b-1-IM-Marker 5043.70 4190.19 3263 > .001 .95 .027
Note: CFI and RMSEA are robust estimates.
Fit Statistics
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Table 9 Continued.
Phase Model χ2 S-B χ2 df p CFI RMSEA
Individual Multiplicative Effects Individual Multiplicative Effect-H7b-2 4542.91 3788.48 2928 > .001 .96 .026
Continued Individual Multiplicative Effect-H7b-2-ULMF 4310.99 3567.56 2854 > .001 .97 .026
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H7b-2-IM-Marker 5044.56 4295.10 3263 > .001 .95 .027
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H7c 4462.89 3744.45 2928 > .001 .96 .025
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H7c-ULMF 4229.75 3519.33 2854 > .001 .97 .024
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H7c-IM-Marker 4966.81 4255.16 3263 > .001 .96 .025
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H9a 4944.89 4084.53 3164 > .001 .96 .026
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H9a-ULMF 4712.66 3854.3 3088 > .001 .96 .025
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H9a-IM-Marker 5472.49 4613.58 3512 > .001 .95 .027
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H9b-1 5014.34 4064.11 3164 > .001 .96 .026
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H9b-1-ULMF 4784.46 3836.05 3087 > .001 .96 .025
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H9b-1-IM-Marker 5539.60 4592.14 3511 > .001 .95 .027
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H9b-2 5081.52 4185.83 3164 > .001 .95 .027
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H9b-2-ULMF 4812.51 3918.36 3087 > .001 .96 .026
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H9b-2-IM-Marker 5596.92 4702.71 3511 > .001 .95 .027
Cumulative Multiplicative EffectsCumulative Multiplicative Effects 8314.33 6754.25 4744 > .001 .92 .031
Cumulative Multiplicative Effects-ULMF 7835.72 6280.63 4644 > .001 .93 .030
Cumulative Multiplicative Effects-IM-Marker 8893.63 7337.21 5159 > .001 .92 .032
Final Results Final Model 6988.00 5577.89 4183 > .001 .93 .029
Final Model-ULMF 6586.55 5307.73 4094 > .001 .94 .027
Final Model-IM-Marker 7627.44 6163.23 4579 > .001 .93 .029
Note: CFI and RMSEA are robust estimates.
Fit Statistics
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Table 10: Change in Fit for Structural Models.
More Restrictive Model Less Restrictive Model Δ χ2 Δ df p value Δ CFI Δ RMSEA
Main Effects Original Main Effects Revised 78.62 5 < .001 .004 .001
Main Effects Original-ULMC Main Effects Revised-ULMC 38.37 5 < .001 .002 .001
Main Effects Original-Marker Main Effects Revised-Marker 75.26 5 < .001 .004 .002
Note: Change in χ2 is Scaled S-B; change in CFI and RMSEA are robust estimates.
Main Effects Revisions
Model Comparisons Change in Fit
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Establishing main effects. 
Main Effects-Original. 
The first structural model (Main Effects-Original) added linear paths to the Final 
Measurement Model as specified in the proposed model. Three linear regression 
equations were added: (1) ECI predicting Organizational Identification, (2) ECI and 
Goals Climate Scale predicting Department UPB, and (3) ECI, Goals Climate Scale, 
Department UPB, Organizational Identification, Relativism, Idealism, MPQ, and Fear 
Tolerance predicting Individual UPB. Because the Goals Climate Scale resulted in a two-
factor structure, paths were added from both Goals Pressure and Goals Empowerment to 
predict Individual UPB and Department UPB. For the hypotheses proposing curvilinear 
effects (ECI predicting Individual UPB and Department UPB), linear paths were added at 
this stage in order for the subsequent quadratic paths to be properly statistically specified. 
Main Effects-Original demonstrated good fit (S-B χ2(2713) = 3557.37, p < .001; CFI = 
.96, RMSEA = .03).  
Main Effects-Revised. 
The LM test was used to determine whether any additional main effect paths 
should be added beyond those hypothesized (Breusch & Pagan, 1980). This step is 
necessary to determine if the participants’ responses indicate any unexpected 
relationships between the dependent variables and the other constructs included in model. 
If these unexpected relationships are not accounted for, it can reduce the accuracy of the 
hypothesis testing, leading to misinterpretation of the results. If the model fit is 
significantly improved by the addition of a path, this indicates that the path should be 
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added to properly specify the model. Based on the LM test, five additional main effect 
paths were added: (1) Empathetic Concern (a first order factor in the ECI) predicting 
Organizational Identification, (2) Moral Motivation (another first order ECI factor) 
predicting Organizational Identification, (3) Moral Motivation predicting Individual 
UPB, (4) Moral Motivation predicting Department UPB, and (5) MPQ predicting 
Department UPB. The same five paths were necessary when not controlling for method 
effects (Main Effects-Original), when controlling method effects with the unmeasured 
latent method factor (Main Effects-Original-ULMF), and when controlling for method 
effects using the IM marker variable (Main Effects-IM-Original-Marker). The additional 
parameters significantly improved model fit (Scaled Δ S-B χ2(5) = 78.62, p < .001; Δ CFI 
= .004, Δ RMSEA = .001).  
Testing multiplicative effects. 
 Creating multiplicative latent variables. 
To test the hypothesized interaction effects, latent interaction variables were 
created (Marsh, Wen, & Hau, 2004). First, all measured items were mean centered. Then, 
to create an interaction variable to test the interaction of two factors A and B, the most 
reliable item from factor A is multiplied by the most reliable item from factor B. This is 
repeated with the two second most reliable items and the two third most reliable items. 
This creates three A*B items, which are then loaded onto a latent A*B factor. The A*B 
factor is added to the model and is allowed to covary with the other exogenous variables, 
and a structural path is added between the A*B factor and the appropriate dependent 
variable. 
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To test interactions where a second order factor C interacts with a first order 
factor D, the process described above is repeated for each of the first order factors within 
C. If C has six first order factors, this would create six first order interaction factors 
(C1*D, C2*D, C3*D, C4*D, C5*D, and C6*D). Then, the six first order interaction 
factors would load onto a single second order interaction factor. 
To test the hypothesized quadratic effects, a similar process is used to create latent 
quadratic variables. To create a quadratic variable to test the quadratic effect of factor A, 
the most reliable A item is squared, as are the second- and third- most reliable items. 
Then, these three squared items are loaded onto a latent quadratic factor A*A. For second 
order factors, each of the first order factors are squared with themselves (A1*A1, A2*A2, 
etc) and then loaded onto a single second order quadratic variable. 
Individual multiplicative effects. 
To test each of the 15 hypothesized interaction effects and the two hypothesized 
quadratic effects, all necessary multiplicative factors were created and tested in separate 
Individual Multiplicative Effects models by adding each one individually to Main Effects-
Revised. See Table 11 for the unstandardized parameter estimate, SSE, and p value for 
the hypothesized multiplicative effect in each Individual Multiplicative Effects model. 
Hypothesized multiplicative effects with nonsignificant parameter estimates in the 
Individual Multiplicative Effect models were considered not supported and were not 
tested further. One hypothesized quadratic effect and three interactions had significant 
parameter estimates: (1) H1a (ECI*ECI predicting Individual UPB), (2) H4a-1 
(ECI*Goals Pressure predicting Individual UPB), (3) H9a (MPQ*Organizational 
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Identification predicting UPB), and (4) H9b-2 (MPQ*Goals Empowerment predicting 
Individual UPB). These four multiplicative hypotheses were retained for further testing. 
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Table 11: Unstandardized Parameter Estimates of Individual Multiplicative Effects.
Model Name Multiplicative Effect
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H1a ECI*ECI -.25*** (.08)  
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H1a-ULMF ECI*ECI -.26** (.09)
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H1a-IM-Marker ECI*ECI -.24** (.08)
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H1b ECI*ECI  .10 (.08)
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H1b-ULMF ECI*ECI  .09 (.08)
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H1b-IM-Marker ECI*ECI  .10 (.08)
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H4a-1 ECI*Goals Pressure  .23*** (.07)
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H4a-1-ULMF ECI*Goals Pressure  .23*** (.07)
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H4a-1-IM-Marker ECI*Goals Pressure  .20** (.07)
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H4a-2 ECI*Goals Empowerment  .01 (.09)
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H4a-2-ULMF ECI*Goals Empowerment -.01 (.09)
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H4a-2-IM-Marker ECI*Goals Empowerment -.03 (.08)
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H4b-1 ECI*Goals Pressure  .10 (.08)
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H4b-1-ULMF ECI*Goals Pressure  .11 (.08)
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H4b-1-IM-Marker ECI*Goals Pressure  .10 (.08)
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H4b-2 ECI*Goals Empowerment  .03 (.09)
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H4b-2-ULMF ECI*Goals Empowerment  .02 (.08)
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H4b-2-IM-Marker ECI*Goals Empowerment  .03 (.09)
Note: p < .05*, p < .01**, p < .001.
Parameter Estimate (SE)
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Table 11 Continued.
Model Name Multiplicative Effect
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H6a ECI*Relativism  .10 (.06)
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H6a-ULMF ECI*Relativism  .10 (.06)
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H6a-IM-Marker ECI*Relativism  .11 (.06)
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H6b-1 Goals Pressure*Relativism -.03 (.02)
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H6b-1-ULMF Goals Pressure*Relativism -.03 (.02)
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H6b-1-IM-Marker Goals Pressure*Relativism -.03 (.02)
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H6b-2 Goals Empowerment*Relativism  .01 (.02)
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H6b-2-ULMF Goals Empowerment*Relativism  .01 (.01)
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H6b-2-IM-Marker Goals Empowerment*Relativism  .01 (.02)
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H6c Org. Ident*Relativism  .01 (.01)
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H6c-ULMF Org. Ident*Relativism  .01 (.01)
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H6c-IM-Marker Org. Ident*Relativism  .02 (.01)
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H7a ECI*Idealism  .09 (.08)
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H7a-ULMF ECI*Idealism  .08 (.08)
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H7a-IM-Marker ECI*Idealism  .12 (.08)
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H7b-1 Goals Pressure*Idealism -.01 (.03)
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H7b-1-ULMF Goals Pressure*Idealism -.01 (.03)
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H7b-1-IM-Marker Goals Pressure*Idealism  .00 (.03)
Note: p < .05*, p < .01**, p < .001.
Parameter Estimate (SE)
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Table 11 Continued.
Model Name Multiplicative Effect
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H7b-2 Goals Empowerment*Idealism -.02 (.03)
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H7b-2-ULMF Goals Empowerment*Idealism -.02 (.03)
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H7b-2-IM-Marker Goals Empowerment*Idealism -.01 (.03)
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H7c Org. Ident*Idealism -.02 (.02)
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H7c-ULMF Org. Ident*Idealism -.02 (.03)
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H7c-IM-Marker Org. Ident*Idealism -.01 (.03)
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H9a Org. Ident*Moral Potency -.26*** (.07)
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H9a-ULMF Org. Ident*Moral Potency -.26** (.08)
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H9a-IM-Marker Org. Ident*Moral Potency -.25*** (.07)
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H9b-1 Goals Pressure*Moral Potency  .00 (.07)
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H9b-1-ULMF Goals Pressure*Moral Potency  .00 (.08)
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H9b-1-IM-Marker Goals Pressure*Moral Potency  .00 (.07)
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H9b-2 Goals Empowerment*Moral Potency -.20** (.07)
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H9b-2-ULMF Goals Empowerment*Moral Potency -.19* (.08)
Individual Multiplicative Effect-H9b-2-IM-Marker Goals Empowerment*Moral Potency -.19* (.07)
Note: p < .05*, p < .01**, p < .001.
Parameter Estimate (SE)
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 Cumulative multiplicative effects. 
The four hypothesized multiplicative effects that were supported individually 
were tested together in order to determine which would still be supported after removing 
explained variance shared with each other. However, testing four multiplicative effects 
together led to complications due to the large number of multiplicative terms added to the 
model. To test the three significant interactions and the significant quadratic effect 
together required the addition of 48 multiplicative items, loading onto 16 first order latent 
variables and two second order latent variables. This was problematic because each item 
added to the model results in a slight reduction in model fit, and multiplicative items in 
particular increase multivariate kurtosis, or non-normality (Cortina, Chen, & Dunlap, 
2001). Without adequate model fit and acceptable multivariate normality, the results of 
hypothesis testing cannot be trusted to be accurate (Bollen, 1989). Although the model 
maintained adequate fit when each multiplicative effect was tested separately, and the use 
of the Satorra-Bentler method helped to correct for the multivariate kurtosis, including all 
four significant multiplicative effects caused the model to have poor fit (S-B χ2(7387) = 
14408.08, p < .001, CFI = .83, RMSEA = .05) and very high multivariate kurtosis 
(normalized estimate = 143.81). The multiplicative effects involving the ECI were the 
most problematic, as each one required the addition of 18 product terms (three for each 
factor). For this reason, the composite approach to latent variable interactions was used 
for multiplicative effects involving the ECI (Cortina et al., 2001). 
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Creating composite multiplicative terms. 
In order to reduce the number of multiplicative terms added to the model while 
still testing all significant effects simultaneously, composite terms were used to test the 
multiplicative effects involving the ECI: H1a (ECI*ECI predicting Individual UPB) and 
H4a-1 (ECI*Goals Pressure predicting Individual UPB; Cortina et al., 2001). Composites 
of the mean centered factors were created for each first order ECI factor and for Goals 
Pressure. Items contributing to each composite term were weighted according to their 
reliability to improve the reliability of the resulting composite terms. To test H1a, the 
composite versions of each ECI factor were squared and then loaded onto a single latent 
quadratic factor. To test H4a-1, the composite version of Goals Pressure was multiplied 
with each of the composite ECI factors and then loaded onto a single latent interaction 
factor. Thus, the model Cumulative Multiplicative Effects-Composite tested all significant 
effects simultaneously while also the reducing the total number of multiplicative items 
from 48 to 24. This reduction in multiplicative items significantly improved the model fit 
(Scaled Δ S-B χ2 (2643) = 6093.75, p < .001, Δ CFI = .06, Δ RMSEA = .02) and reduced 
the normalized estimate of multivariate kurtosis from 143.81 to 119.40. 
Final Model. 
 One of the four significant multiplicative effects (H9b-2: MPQ*Goals 
Empowerment predicting Individual UPB) became nonsignificant when tested in 
Cumulative Multiplicative Effects and Cumulative Multiplicative Effects-Composite; this 
effect was dropped from the Final Model to improve model parsimony and statistical 
power. Thus, the Final Model included all of the hypothesized main effects (significant 
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and non-significant), five additional main effects, and the three significant hypothesized 
multiplicative effects (H1a: ECI*ECI predicting Individual UPB, H4a-1: ECI*Goals 
Pressure predicting Individual UPB, and H9a: MPQ*Organizational Identification 
predicting UPB). The Final Model demonstrated adequate fit (S-B χ2(4183) = 5577.89, p 
< .001; CFI = .93, RMSEA = .03). See Table 12 for unstandardized parameter estimates, 
SSE, and p values for the Final Model. See Figure 3.1 for the Final Model with 
standardized parameter estimates included, Figure 3.2 for Final Model-ULMF with 
standardized parameter estimates, and Figure 3.3 for Final Model-IM-Marker with 
standardized parameter estimates. 
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Table 12: Unstandardized Parameter Estimates for Final Model with and without Method Controls.
Final Model-IM-Marker
Predicting Org Ident
ECI 2.02*** (.32) 2.08*** (.36) 2.20*** (.36)
ECI-Empathic Concern -.30* (.12) -.29** (.11) -.34** (.13)
ECI-Moral Motivation -.23** (.08) -.30* (.13) -.34** (.13)
R2
Predicting Individual UPB
ECI  .14 (.14)  .18 (.16)  .12 (.14)
Organizational Identification  .30*** (.04)  .31*** (.04)  .29*** (.04)
Goals Pressure  .00 (.08) -.01 (.08) -.01 (.08)
Goals Empowerment  .10 (.09)  .10 (.08)  .11 (.09)
Dept. UPB  .14* (.06)  .14* (.06)  .14* (.06)
Idealism -.12* (.05) -.11* (.05) -.09 (.05)
Relativism  .01 (.03)  .01 (.03)  .01 (.03)
MPQ -.70*** (.14) -.67*** (.14) -.41*** (.13)
Fear Tolerance  .05 (.07)  .05 (.07)  .05 (.07)
ECI-Moral Motivation -.19*** (.06) -.30** (.08) -.20** (.07)
ECI*ECI (H1a) -.19* (.08) -.20* (.08) -.20* (.08)
ECI*Goals Pressure (H4a-1) .26*** (.07)  .24*** (.07)  .22*** (.07)
Org. Ident*MPQ (H9a) -.22** (.08) -.22** (.08) -.20** (.08)
R2
Predicting Department UPB
ECI  .04 (.16)  .01 (.19)  .02 (.17)
Goals Pressure  .03 (.09)  .00 (.08)  .03 (.09)
Goals Empowerment  .01 (.10)  .03 (.10)  .03 (.10)
ECI-Moral Character -.49*** (.06) -.49*** (.09) -.50*** (.09)
Moral Potency -.31*** (.09) -.30*** (.09) -.22** (.08)
R2
Note: Values in Final Model column do not control for method effects; values in Final Model-ULMF
column control for common method variance; values in Final Model-IM-Marker column control for
common method bias. p < .05*, p < .01**, p < .001***
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Figure 3.1: Standardized Parameter Estimates for Final Model. 
 
Note: Dotted paths are main effects added post hoc based on the LM test. Red paths are multiplicative effects. 
Values are from the model not controlling for method effects. p < .05*, p < .01**, p < .001*
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Figure 3.2: Standardized Parameter Estimates for Final Model-ULMF. 
 
Note: Dotted paths are main effects added post hoc based on the LM test. Red paths are multiplicative effects. 
Values are from the model controlling for method effects with the ULMF. p < .05*, p < .01**, p < .001*** 
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Figure 3.3: Standardized Parameter Estimates for Final Model-IM-Marker. 
 
Note: Dotted paths are main effects added post hoc based on the LM test. Red paths are multiplicative effects. 
Values are from the model controlling for method effects with the IM marker variable. p < .05*, p < .01**, p < .001*** 
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Hypothesis Results 
The main effect hypotheses were considered supported if they demonstrated 
statistically significant parameter estimates in the Final Model. Multiplicative hypotheses 
were considered supported if they had statistically significant parameter estimates in the 
Individual Multiplicative Effects models and remained significant when tested 
cumulatively in the Cumulative Multiplicative Effects model and the Final Model. The 
conclusions reached for all hypotheses were the same when controlling for method 
effects using the unmeasured latent method factor, controlling for method effects with the 
IM marker variable, and when not controlling for method effects, except for H5b. Except 
where explicitly stated, the results reported in this section are from the models controlling 
for method effects using the unmeasured latent method factor (Final Model-ULMF, 
Cumulative Multiplicative Effects-ULMF, and Individual Multiplicative Effects-ULMF). 
H1a. 
A significant negative curvilinear effect was found between the second order ECI 
factor and Individual UPB, supporting H1a5 (quadratic term: B = -.20, SE = .08, p < .05; 
linear term: B = .18, SE = .16, ns). However, the shape of the relationship was slightly 
different than hypothesized. I predicted that as ethical climate increased from low to 
moderate levels there would be no effect on individuals’ willingness to engage in UPB, 
and that as ethical climate increased from moderate to high levels there would be a 
                                                          
5 Due to practical statistical constraints, the significance of the simple slopes for the curvilinear effect of 
H1a was not tested, despite being predicted in the hypothesis. It is not common practice to empirically test 
the simple slopes of quadratic effects, and the statistical outputs given by structural equation modeling 
programs do not include the necessary coefficient covariance values to calculate the significance of simple 
slopes for multiplicative effects. Instead, the presence of a significant negative quadratic effect and shape of 
the curvilinear effect at low, moderate, and high ethical climate was used as evidence of support for the 
hypothesis. 
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decrease in individuals’ willingness to engage in UPB. Instead, the results indicated an 
inverse U-shaped relationship where increasing ethical climate from low to moderate 
levels sharply increased individuals’ willingness towards UPB and increasing ethical 
climate from moderate to high levels slightly decreased individuals’ willingness towards 
UPB. Counterintuitively, individuals’ willingness towards UPB was higher on average 
for those who reported high ECI scores compared to those who reported low ECI scores. 
See Figure 4.1 for a graph of the curvilinear relationship found in between ethical climate 
and individuals’ willingness towards UPB. 
Figure 4.1: Curvilinear Relationship between Ethical Climate and Individuals’ UPB. 
 
The results of hypothesis H1a were affected by the addition of a direct path 
between Moral Motivation (an ECI first order factor) and Individual UPB (B = -.30, SE = 
.08, p < .01). This path was added during the Main Effects-Revised stage, based on the 
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results of the LM test. Moral Motivation is highly correlated with the full ECI scale, as 
evidenced by its factor loading (λ = .85). The Moral Motivation subscale has a stronger 
negative correlation with the Individual UPB factor (r = -.30) than does the full ECI scale 
(r = -.21). This correlation pattern resulted in inconsistent mediation, which strengthened 
Moral Motivation’s negative effect and reversed the ECI’s linear effect on Individual 
UPB from negative to positive (MacKinnon, Fairchild, & Fritz, 2010). The results of 
models Main Effects-Original and Main Effects-Revised support this claim: in Main 
Effects-Original, the ECI’s parameter estimate predicting Individual UPB was negative 
(B = -.15, SE = .14, ns). After the addition of Moral Motivation as a predictor of 
Individual UPB in Main Effects-Revised, the ECI’s parameter estimate predicting 
Individual UPB was positive (B = .19, SE = .16, ns).  
The effect of ethical climate on individuals’ willingness towards UPB was 
recalculated, this time including the indirect effect of the second order ECI through Moral 
Motivation along with the direct linear and quadratic effects of the second order ECI 
predicting Individual UPB. The resulting curvilinear relationship was closer to that 
predicted. See Figure 4.2. The overall shape is still an inverted U, but the revised results 
indicate that individuals’ willingness towards UPB is higher on average for those who 
reported low ethical climate compared to those who reported high ethical climate. 
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Figure 4.2: Curvilinear relationship between ethical climate and individuals’ UPB, 
Revised. 
 
Note: Accounts for the direct path between Moral Motivation and Individual UPB. 
H1b. 
H1b was not supported; no significant curvilinear relationship was found between 
ethical climate and department-wide UPB (quadratic term: B = .09, SE = .08, ns; linear 
term: B = .07, SE = .19, ns). 
The relationship between ethical climate and departmental UPB was affected by 
the addition of a direct path between Moral Motivation (an ECI first order factor) and 
Department UPB (B = -.49, SE = .09, p < .001). This additional path lead to a significant 
negative indirect effect from ethical climate to departmental UPB through Moral 
Motivation (B = -.84, SE = .15, p < .001). As ECI scores increased by one point, reported 
Departmental UPB decreased by .84 points through the mediating effect of Moral 
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Motivation. The addition of this indirect effect removed explained variation previously 
attributed to the second order ECI factor predicting departmental UPB: prior to the 
addition of the direct path from Moral Motivation to Department UPB (in model Main 
Effects-Original), there was a significant negative effect between the second order ECI 
factor and Department UPB (B = -.90, SE = .12, p < .001). After Moral Motivation was 
added as a predictor of Department UPB (in Main Effects-Revised), there was no longer a 
significant direct effect between the second order ECI and Department UPB (B = .05, SE 
= .19, ns). 
The addition of the direct path between Moral Motivation and Department UPB 
explains the lack of a direct linear effect between the second order ECI and Department 
UPB, but it does not explain the lack of the hypothesized curvilinear effect. In the interest 
of thoroughness, a quadratic effect was also tested for Moral Motivation predicting 
departmental UPB, but this produced no effect (B = .00, SE = .02, ns). H1b is therefore 
considered not supported.  
H2a. 
A significant positive relationship was found between ethical climate and 
organizational identification, supporting H2a (B = 2.08, SE = .36, p < .001). As 
individuals’ second order ECI scores increased by one point, individuals’ organizational 
identification scores increased by two points. 
This effect was strengthened by the addition of direct paths from two of the ECI’s 
first order factors predicting organizational identification: Empathic Concern (B = -.29, 
SE = .11, p < .01) and Moral Motivation (B = -.30, SE = .13 p < .05). Empathic Concern 
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and Moral Motivation are highly correlated with the second order ECI, as evidenced by 
their factor loadings (λ = .88, λ = .85). The second order ECI has a stronger positive 
correlation with organizational identification (r = .58) than does Empathic Concern (r = 
.47) or Moral Motivation (r = .36). This correlation pattern resulted in inconsistent 
mediation, which strengthened the positive effect of the second order ECI on 
organizational identification and reversed the effects of Empathic Concern and Moral 
Motivation predicting organizational identification from positive to negative (MacKinnon 
et al., 2010). 
Even without this statistical anomaly, ethical climate demonstrated a strong 
positive effect on organizational identification. In the Main Effects-Original model 
(before Empathic Concern and Moral Motivation were added as predictors of 
organizational identification), there was a significant positive relationship between the 
second order ECI and organizational identification (B = 1.08, SE = .08, p < .001). Also, in 
the Final Model, the effect of ethical climate on organizational identification was 
recalculated after controlling for the inconsistent mediation of the ECI through Empathic 
Concern and Moral Motivation. The total effect of ethical climate on organizational 
identification is .59. As second order ECI scores increased by 1 point, the total causal 
effect on organizational identification scores was an increase of .59 points.  
H2b. 
H2b was supported: there was a significant positive relationship between 
organizational identification and individuals’ willingness to engage in UPB (B = .31, SE 
= .04, p < .001). 
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H3a-1, H3a-2, H3b-1, and H3b-2. 
H3a-1, H3a-2, H3b-1, and H3b-2 were all not supported. There was no significant 
relationship between pressuring goals climate and individuals’ willingness towards UPB 
(B = -.01, SE = .08, ns), empowering goals climate and individuals’ willingness towards 
UPB (B = .10, SE = .08, ns), pressuring goals climate and department-wide UPB (B = .00, 
SE = .08, ns), or empowering goals climate and department-wide UPB (B = .03, SE = .10, 
ns). 
H4a-1. 
H4a-1 was supported: there was a significant positive interaction between ethical 
climate and pressuring goals climate predicting individuals’ willingness towards UPB (B 
= .23, SE = .07, p < .001). As ECI scores increased by 1 point, the slope of pressuring 
goals climate predicting individuals’ willingness towards UPB increased by .23 points. 
The slope of pressuring goals climate predicting individuals’ willingness towards UPB 
was negative when ethical climate was low, there was no relationship between pressuring 
goals climate and individuals’ willingness towards UPB when ethical climate was 
average, and the slope of pressuring goals climate predicting individuals’ willingness 
towards UPB was positive when ethical climate was high. See Figure 5 for a graph of the 
interaction between ethical climate and pressuring goals climate predicting individuals’ 
UPB. 
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Figure 5: Interaction between Ethical Climate and Pressuring Goals Climate predicting 
Individuals’ UPB. 
 
Although the interaction effect of ethical climate and pressuring goals climate on 
individuals’ willingness towards UPB was as predicted, the simple slopes of pressuring 
goals climate at average and low ethical climate were unexpected. Although it was not 
explicitly stated in hypothesis H4a, it was expected that the simple slope of goals climate 
at low ethical climate would be flat or slightly positive as opposed to negative and the 
simple slope of goals climate at average ethical climate would be positive instead of flat. 
This would have been the result of the interaction between ethical climate and pressuring 
goals climate if there had been a significant positive main effect of pressuring goals 
climate on individuals’ willingness towards UPB, as H3a-1 predicted. However, 
pressuring goals climate was not found to have a significant main effect on individuals’ 
willingness to engage in UPB (B = -.01, SE = .08, ns). The lack of a main effect between 
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pressuring goals climate and individuals’ willingness towards UPB caused the simple 
slopes of the interaction to slant in opposite directions rather than to all branch upwards.  
H4a-2. 
There was no significant interaction between ethical climate and empowering 
goals climate predicting individuals’ willingness towards UPB (B = -.01, SE = .09, ns). 
H4b-1 and H4b-2. 
H4b-1 and H4b-2 were not supported. There was no significant interaction 
between ethical climate and pressuring goals climate predicting department-wide UPB (B 
= .11, SE = .08, ns) or ethical climate and empowering goals climate predicting 
department-wide UPB (B = .02, SE = .08, ns). 
H5a and H5b. 
H5a was not supported: no significant relationship was found between relativism 
and individuals’ willingness towards UPB (B = .01, SE = .03, ns). H5b was mostly 
supported: a significant negative relationship was found between idealism and 
individuals’ willingness towards UPB in the Final Model (B = -.12, SE = .05, p < .05) 
and when controlling for method effects in Final Model-ULMF (B = -.11, SE = .05, p < 
.05), but not when controlling for method effects in Final Model-IM-Marker (B = -.09, 
SE = .05, p = .07).  
H6a, H6b-1, H6b-2, and H6c. 
H6a, H6b-1, H6b-2, and H6c were all not supported. There was no significant 
interaction between relativism and ethical climate (B = .10, SE = .06, ns), relativism and 
pressuring goals climate (B = -.03, SE = .02, ns), relativism and empowering goals 
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climate (B = .01, SE = .01, ns) or relativism and organizational identification (B = .01, SE 
= .01, ns) predicting individuals’ willingness to engage in UPB. 
H7a, H7b-1, H7b-2, and H7c. 
H7a, H7b-1, H7b-2, and H7c were all not supported. There was no significant 
interaction between idealism and ethical climate (B = .08, SE = .08, ns), idealism and 
pressuring goals climate (B = -.01, SE = .03, ns), idealism and empowering goals climate 
(B = -.02, SE = .03, ns) or idealism and organizational identification (B = -.02, SE = .03, 
ns) predicting individuals’ willingness to engage in UPB. 
H8. 
H8 was supported: a significant negative relationship was found between moral 
potency and individuals’ willingness to engage in UPB (B = -.67, SE = .14, p < .001). As 
participants’ MPQ scores increased by one point, participants’ Individual UPB scores 
decreased by .67 points. 
H9a. 
There was a significant negative interaction between moral potency and 
organizational identification predicting individuals’ willingness towards UPB, supporting 
H9a (B = -.22, SE = .08, p < .01). As individuals’ MPQ scores increased by 1 point, the 
slope of organizational identification predicting individuals’ willingness towards UPB 
decreased by .22 points. The slope of organizational identification predicting individuals’ 
willingness towards UPB was slightly positive for participants with high moral potency, 
moderately positive for those with average moral potency, and highly positive for those 
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with low moral potency. See Figure 6 for the interaction between moral potency and 
organizational identification predicting individuals’ willingness towards UPB. 
Figure 6: Interaction between Organizational Identification and Moral Potency 
predicting Individuals’ UPB. 
 
H9b-1 and H9b-2. 
H9b-1 was not supported. There was no significant interaction between moral 
potency and pressuring goals climate predicting individuals’ UPB (B = .00, SE = .08, ns). 
H9b-2 was initially supported, but was not supported in the cumulative model. There was 
a significant negative interaction between empowering goals climate and moral potency 
predicting individuals’ UPB when tested in the Individual Multiplicative Effects model (B 
= -.19, SE = .08, p < .05), but this relationship was nonsignificant when tested along with 
the other significant interactions in the Cumulative Multiplicative Effects model (B = -.04, 
SE = .08, ns). 
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Unhypothesized Main Effects 
 Six unhypothesized main effects were found to be significant. Although not 
attached to a specific hypothesis, a path between Department UPB and Individual UPB 
was included in the proposed model. Departmental UPB was found to have a significant 
positive effect on individuals’ willingness to engage in UPB (B = .14, SE = .06, p < .05). 
Five additional main effect paths were added post hoc, based on unexpected variable 
relationships indicated by the LM test. Moral potency was found to have a strong 
negative relationship with departmental UPB (B = -.30, SE = .09, p < .001). The 
remaining four unexpected main effects involved first order factors from the ECI: (1) 
Moral Motivation predicting individuals’ willingness towards UPB (B = -.30, SE = .08, p 
< .01), (2) Moral Motivation predicting departmental UPB (B = -.49, SE = .09, p < .001), 
(3) Empathic Concern predicting organizational identification (B = -.29, SE = .11, p < 
.01), and (4) Moral Motivation predicting organizational identification (B = -.30, SE = 
.13, p < .05).  
As explained in subsection H2a, although Empathic Concern (r = .47) and Moral 
Motivation (r = .36) both had positive correlations with organizational identification, the 
second order ECI factor had a stronger positive correlation with organizational 
identification (r = .58). Because subscales Empathic Concern (λ = .88) and Moral 
Motivation (λ = .85) are both highly correlated with the second order ECI, the relative 
weakness of the subscales’ correlation with organizational identification caused their 
parameter estimates to be negative instead of positive, resulting in inconsistent mediation 
(MacKinnon et al., 2007). 
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Deconstructing the Effect of Ethical Climate on Individuals’ UPB 
 The Final Model includes numerous paths that estimate the effect of ethical 
climate on individuals’ willingness towards UPB, including direct causal6 effects, 
indirect causal effects, non-causal effects, and a moderating effect. Using the Sobel 
(1982) test for mediation, 5 of the indirect causal effects were found to be significant: (1) 
the 2-path effect through Moral Motivation (ß = -.31, SE = .14, p < .001), (2) the 2-path 
effect through Organizational Identification (ß = .48, SE = .14, p < .001), (3) the 3-path 
effect through Empathic Concern and Organizational Identification (ß = -.12, SE = .06, p 
< .05), (4) the 3-path effect through Moral Motivation and Organizational Identification 
(ß = -.12, SE = .07, p < .05), and (5) the 3-path effect through Moral Motivation and 
Department UPB (ß = -.09, SE = .05, p < .05). 
The three standardized indirect effects through organizational identification total 
to .24; as ECI scores increased by 1 SD, Individual UPB scores increased by .24 SDs due 
to ethical climate’s effect on organizational identification. Considering all causal paths, 
the total standardized linear effect of ethical climate on individuals’ willingness towards 
UPB is -.03, with a standardized quadratic effect of -.15. See Figure 7.1 for a graph of the 
total causal effect of ethical climate on individuals’ UPB. 
 
 
 
                                                          
6 In structural equation modeling, “causal” effects involve regression paths connecting dependent variables 
to their predictor variables and “non-causal” effects involve to model-specified correlations between 
variables. Causal effects are not meant to imply true causality of one variable on another. 
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Figure 7.1: Total Causal Effect of Ethical Climate on Individuals’ UPB. 
 
Note: Includes all significant direct and indirect causal paths. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
2.2
2.4
2.6
2.8
3
-2 -1.5 -1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2
In
di
vi
du
al
 U
PB
Ethical Climate
(Standard deviations from mean)
125 
There is also one significant non-causal effect of ethical climate on individuals’ 
willingness towards UPB, through ethical climate’s correlation with moral potency (ß = 
.22, SE = .07, p < .001). Adding this non-causal effect to the total causal effect, the total 
association between ethical climate and individuals’ willingness towards UPB is a 
standardized linear effect of -.25, with a standardized quadratic term of -.15. See Figure 
7.2 for a graph of the total association between ethical climate and individuals’ 
willingness towards UPB. 
Figure 7.2: Total Association between Ethical Climate and Individuals’ UPB. 
 
Note: Includes all significant causal and non-causal paths. 
 
 
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
2.2
2.4
2.6
2.8
3
-2 -1.5 -1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2
In
di
vi
du
al
 U
PB
Ethical Climate
(Standard deviations from mean)
126 
 To visualize all of the effects of ethical climate on individuals’ willingness 
towards UPB, the interaction between ethical climate and pressuring goals climate was 
graphed along with ethical climate’s total association with individuals’ willingness 
towards UPB. See Figure 8. 
Figure 8: All Significant Model-Implied Effects of Ethical Climate on Individuals’ UPB. 
 
Note: Includes the interaction with pressuring goals climate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
2.2
2.4
2.6
2.8
3
-1.5 -0.75 0 0.75 1.5
In
di
vi
du
al
 U
PB
Ethical Climate
127 
CHAPTER FOUR 
DISCUSSION 
 
 This study’s findings support many of the theoretical perspectives on UPB and 
organizational climate. The design of this study was able to deconstruct the multifaceted 
relationship between ethical climate and individuals’ willingness towards UPB. The 
results advance UPB and organizational climate theory by demonstrating the effect of 
multiple climates interacting to predict intentions towards UPB, a strategy never 
previously attempted in UPB research. This study was also the first to identify moral 
potency as a powerful influencing factor on UPB. I will first discuss the major findings of 
the present study and offer theoretical explanations for unexpected results. Then, I will 
recount the limitations of this study, and propose strategies to address these problems in 
future research. Finally, I will overview the practical conclusions of this study’s findings. 
Major Findings 
 Ethical climate and UPB. 
As predicted, ethical climate was found to have a complex relationship with UPB, 
exerting both positive and negative influences through a combination of direct, indirect, 
non-causal, and moderating effects. Ethical climate increases individuals’ willingness to 
engage in UPB by (1) increasing employees’ organizational identification and by (2) 
interacting with pressuring goals climate to increase tendencies towards UPB. In contrast, 
ethical climate discourages UPB by (1) exerting a negative linear and quadratic effect on 
individuals’ willingness towards UPB, (2) exerting a negative linear effect on 
department-wide UPB, and (3) through the association between ethical climate and 
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employees’ moral potency. The results indicate that moral motivation is the most 
important dimension within ethical climate for reducing UPB. Ethical climate definitively 
demonstrated a strong negative effect on department-wide UPB, but ethical climate’s 
relationship with individuals’ willingness towards UPB was more complicated. Although 
higher ethical climates were generally associated with lower individual willingness 
towards UPB, the results suggest that this effect may only be appreciable for highly 
ethical climates. Even for highly ethical climates, the reduction in willingness towards 
UPB was neutralized when pressuring goals climate was high. 
Positive effects of ethical climate on UPB. 
Organizational identification’s mediating effect. 
Employees who perceived their workplace to have a strong ethical climate tended 
to have higher organizational identification, which in turn increased their willingness to 
engage in UPB. This supports the argument that employees in workplaces with highly 
ethical climates tend to notice and appreciate the supportive environment provided by 
their employer, leading to higher organizational identification (Treviño et al., 1998; 
Verma & Mohapatra, 2015). Employees with high organizational identification 
internalize the organization’s values and goals as their own, leading to a stronger desire 
to achieve organizational objectives (Avey et al., 2009; Sluss & Ashforth, 2008). 
Employees with high organizational identification may therefore be tempted to “help” 
their organization succeed through engaging in UPB. 
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Pressuring goals climate’s interaction effect. 
Ethical climate was also found to positively moderate the effect of pressuring 
goals climate on individuals’ willingness towards UPB. This supports the proposition that 
ethical climate operates as a foundational climate, an argument that incorporates 
organizational climate theory and the norm of reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960; Schneider et 
al., 2011). When ethical climate is high, employees feel well supported and are therefore 
more willing to put forth effort on behalf of the organization (Demirtas & Akdogan, 
2014). Employees allocate this extra effort based on their perceptions of the 
organization’s strategic priorities; this in turn strengthens the effectiveness of various 
strategic climates to produce relevant outcomes (Schneider et al., 2011). 
Both of the positive influences of ethical climate on UPB appear to operate 
through increasing employees’ perceptions of organizational support, which in turn 
increases employees’ organizational concern (Pierce & Aguinis, 2013). Although 
organizational concern, or employees’ desire to achieve organizational objectives, is 
understandably considered a positive attribute, these results provide an example of the 
potential unintended consequences of under-regulated employees with high 
organizational concern. 
Negative effects of ethical climate on UPB. 
Moral motivation’s effect. 
The results of this study indicate that certain dimensions of ethical climate have a 
stronger negative effect on UPB than others. Moral motivation had a much stronger 
negative linear effect on individuals’ intentions towards UPB and department-wide UPB 
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than did the other ethical climate dimensions. Indeed, after adding the Moral Motivation 
factor as a predictor of Individual UPB and Department UPB, the linear effects of the 
second order ECI factor on both UPB variables was no longer significant. 
Examining the definition of the Moral Motivation factor and the items it contains, 
it is easy to explain why this ethical climate dimension would have the strongest negative 
effect on UPB. Moral motivation represents the relative value placed on ethical 
considerations when making decisions at work. Items include Around here, power is 
more important than honesty and In order to control scares resources, people in my 
department are willing to compromise their ethical values somewhat. This central theme 
of weighing ethical considerations against other priorities perfectly illustrates the conflict 
between ethical sensitivity and organizational concern that theoretically predicts UPB. In 
fact, one could argue that the moral motivation dimension of ethical climate is the 
collective, group-level form of the ethical sensitivity construct (i.e., the extent that an 
individual emphasizes ethical considerations when making decisions; Pierce & Aguinis, 
2015). A high score on Moral Motivation would indicate that ethical values are 
prioritized above all other considerations when making workplace decisions; this would 
virtually rule out the possibility of UPB, as long as all employees complied with 
departmental norms. Based on these considerations, it seems logical that moral 
motivation would have a strong negative effect on both department-wide UPB and 
individuals’ intentions towards UPB. 
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Ethical climate’s curvilinear effect. 
Although the moral motivation dimension was responsible for the significant 
negative linear effect of ethical climate on both department-wide UPB and individuals’ 
willingness to engage in UPB, the second order ethical climate factor contributed the 
significant negative quadratic effect on individuals’ intentions towards UPB. When the 
linear and quadratic terms were considered together, the curvilinear direct effect of 
ethical climate on individuals’ willingness towards UPB was close to my prediction: 
increasing a department’s ethical climate from low to moderate levels produced slight 
increases in individuals’ tendencies towards UPB, but increasing ethical climate from 
moderate to high levels was associated with sharp decreases in individuals’ willingness to 
engage in UPB. While a downward-sloping curvilinear relationship was predicted, I 
expected that increasing ethical climate from low to moderate levels would result in no 
change in individuals’ willingness towards UPB rather than a slight increase in 
individuals’ UPB. 
Perhaps the shape of the curvilinear effect between ethical climate and 
individuals’ willingness towards UPB was slightly different than predicted due to the 
existence of an additional positive indirect effect between ethical climate and individuals’ 
UPB for which this study did not control. Past research has proposed that strong ethical 
climates increase employees’ organizational concern, which explains the positive 
influence of ethical climate on UPB (Pierce & Aguinis, 2013). The present study used 
organizational identification as a proxy for organizational concern because there are 
currently no scales available that directly measure organizational concern. It is possible 
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that the Organizational Identification scale did not fully capture all aspects of 
participants’ organizational concern, leading to an underestimation of the positive 
indirect effect of ethical climate on UPB. If any portion of the indirect positive effect 
between ethical climate and individuals’ UPB was left unmeasured, this would become 
confounded with the direct effect between ethical climate and UPB and cause the model-
implied curvilinear effect of ethical climate on individuals’ UPB to be less negative than 
expected. 
Despite the slight deviation from the hypothesized curve, the results still support 
the prediction that highly ethical climates are associated with exponentially lower 
individual willingness towards UPB than all other levels of ethical climate. Past research 
on ethical leadership offers a theoretical explanation for this effect: Miao and colleagues 
(2013) argued that moderately ethical leaders are ineffective in reducing UPB because 
they send the message that behaving ethically is important, but perhaps not as important 
as achieving other organizational goals. In contrast, highly ethical leaders send the 
message that behaving ethically is a top priority; this clear and consistent message is 
therefore more effective in influencing employee behavior away from UPB. Likewise, 
employees develop ethical climate perceptions based on many environmental cues, 
including workplace ethics policies, how those policies are enacted, and observations of 
which employee behaviors are rewarded or punished (Schneider et al., 2013). Employees 
determine how they should behave in ethical dilemmas by discerning the message created 
by this combination of environmental cues. Perhaps departments with highly ethical 
climates are able to achieve consistent alignment of all workplace ethical cues, making 
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the behavioral expectations conveyed by a highly ethical climate much easier to interpret 
than those conveyed by a moderate or low ethical climate. This could explain why highly 
ethical climates appear to be distinctly effective at reducing employees’ willingness to 
engage in UPB. 
Non-causal effect through moral potency. 
Finally, higher ethical climate is associated with lower UPB due in part to the 
positive correlation between ethical climate and individuals’ moral potency. Employees 
in departments with higher ethical climates were found to have higher levels of moral 
potency on average, which in turn decreased departmental UPB and individuals’ 
willingness towards UPB. 
The significant correlation between ethical climate and moral potency was 
unexpected, as the construct of moral potency is defined as a stable individual trait. It 
could be that over time, working in an environment with a highly ethical climate 
strengthens one’s moral potency. Moral potency represents one’s personal capacity to 
complete the final two steps of the EDM (ethical decision making) process: committing 
to take the most ethical option and then following through with ethical action (Rest, 
1986). Past research has indicated that ethical climate influences the process through 
which employees make ethical decisions in the workplace: ethical climate has been found 
to increase employee moral intensity (DeConick, 2003), and improve ethical judgements 
(Bartels et al., 1998; DeConick, 2003), ethical intentions (Buchan, 2005), and moral 
decision making (Verbeke et al., 1996). This has led some researchers to equate ethical 
climate to a workplace’s normative collective capacity to complete all four steps in the 
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EDM process (Arnaud, 2010). Perhaps through improving the collective capacity of all 
employees to complete the EDM process, ethical climates provide the ideal environment 
in which employees can practice and eventually internalize successful ethical decision 
making, increasing their individual moral potency. 
Alternatively, it could be that employees with high moral potency influence other 
employees through demonstrating their strong commitment to ethical values. Perhaps 
highly morally potent employees act as powerfull role models of proper ethical behavior, 
affecting the overall ethical climate of the workplace. Although it is unclear of the exact 
nature of the relationship, the results of this study indicate that there is a positive 
connection between departmental ethical climate and individuals’ moral potency. 
These results demonstrate the powerful effect that ethical climate can have to 
reduce UPB in the workplace. Among the six ethical climate dimensions, moral 
motivation demonstrated the strongest negative effect on both departmental UPB and 
individuals’ willingness towards UPB. Based on the similarities between the 
departmental moral motivation and individual ethical sensitivity, it is logical to argue that 
ethical workplace climates decrease UPB primarily though increasing employees’ ethical 
sensitivity. Due to the quadratic effect of ethical climate on individuals’ willingness 
towards UPB, highly ethical climates were exponentially more effective at decreasing 
individuals’ willingness towards UPB than other levels of ethical climate. Perhaps this is 
because highly ethical climates are able to send a consistent, easy to interpret message 
concerning the importance of behaving ethically at work. Also, it may be that ethical 
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climates increase individuals’ moral potency, another variable that was found to reduce 
UPB.  
Total effect of ethical climate on UPB. 
Total effect of ethical climate on departmental UPB.  
This study predicted that the total effect of ethical climate on departmental UPB 
would be the same as the total effect of ethical climate on individuals’ willingness 
towards UPB: an inverse U-shaped relationship. It was assumed that ethical climate 
would have the same relationships with organizational concern and ethical sensitivity at 
the group level as it does at the individual level, leading to a similar total effect. It was 
also predicted that the effect of the interaction between ethical climate and goals climate 
would operate in a similar fashion at both the individual and department level.  However, 
none of the hypotheses predicting the specific effects of ethical climate on departmental 
UPB were supported. No curvilinear effect was found between ethical climate and 
departmental UPB, and no interactions were found between ethical climate and goals 
climate predicting departmental UPB. Although there was a significant negative linear 
relationship between the second order ethical climate factor and departmental UPB in 
earlier models, this effect was virtually eliminated by the addition of the moral 
motivation dimension as a predictor of departmental UPB. In the final model, the only 
significant relationship found between ethical climate and departmental UPB was the 
sizable negative effect exerted by moral motivation. 
It is difficult to produce a theoretical argument that explains why there was no 
quadratic effect of ethical climate predicting departmental UPB or any interaction 
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between ethical climate and goals climate predicting departmental UPB, when these 
effects were found to predict individuals’ willingness towards UPB. The reason could 
have to do with the study design, which was entirely self-report and only sampled one 
individual per department. The design did not allow for aggregation of the climate 
measures or departmental UPB, which would have led to a more accurate representation 
of departmental climate and department-wide UPB. One employee’s perceptions of 
departmental climate and UPB may differ from that of coworkers within the same 
department; without a sample of multiple employees per department, there is no way to 
verify the accuracy of a single employee’s perceptions. Research has shown that although 
individual perceptions of department-level climate predict individual behavior well, these 
individual perceptions are less accurate when predicting department-level behavior 
(Ostroff, 1993; Schulte et al., 2006; Schulte et al., 2009). A single employee’s 
perceptions of department-wide incidents of UPB may be especially prone to inaccuracy, 
as coworkers could be motivated to hide their unethical behavior from other employees to 
avoid detection. Still, despite these methodological challenges, the findings indicate that 
ethical climate is a powerful deterrent on departmental UPB. 
Total effect of ethical climate on individuals’ UPB. 
The total causal effect of ethical climate on individuals’ willingness towards UPB 
was a nearly symmetrical inverse U, with low and high ethical climate leading to 
relatively low willingness towards UPB and moderate ethical climate leading to higher 
willingness towards UPB. This mirrors the Miao and colleague’s (2013) finding of the 
curvilinear relationship between ethical leadership and individuals’ willingness towards 
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UPB. The present study extends prior research by identifying and characterizing the 
many individual effects that combine to create the total inverse U-shaped relationship 
between ethical climate and individuals’ willingness to engage in UPB. 
Ethical climate was also found to produce a non-causal effect on individuals’ 
UPB through ethical climate’s positive correlation with individuals’ moral potency. 
When the total association between ethical climate and individuals’ UPB is taken into 
account, low and moderate levels of ethical climate resulted in relatively high willingness 
towards UPB and high levels of ethical climate resulted in much lower willingness 
towards UPB. Finally, when the interaction with pressuring goals climate is added to the 
total association between ethical climate and individuals’ UPB, the results indicate that 
the beneficial effect of highly ethical climates to reduce individuals’ willingness towards 
UPB is neutralized when pressuring goals climate is high. 
  The multitude of conflicting effects between ethical climate and individuals’ 
willingness towards UPB help to explain the inconsistent findings of past research. 
Although one past study found no significant relationship between ethical climate and 
individuals’ intentions towards UPB (Miao et al., 2013) and another found a positive 
relationship (Verma & Mohapatra, 2015), only one of these studies tested for mediating 
effects and neither tested ethical climate for quadratic effects7 or interactions with other 
climates. The design of this study allowed for a deconstruction the multifaceted 
relationship between ethical climate and individuals’ willingness to engage in UPB by (1) 
including variables related to the theoretical mechanisms behind willingness towards 
                                                          
7 Miao and colleagues (2013) did test ethical leadership for quadratic effects, but not ethical climate. 
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UPB, (2) simulating the interconnected nature of the relationships with structural 
equation modeling, and (3) testing for multiplicative effects. 
 Moral potency and UPB. 
 Moral potency stood out as another powerful influence for reducing UPB. Moral 
potency decreased UPB by (1) demonstrated the single strongest effect on individuals’ 
willingness to engage in UPB, (2) unexpectedly demonstrating a significant negative 
effect on department-level UPB, and (3) interacting with organizational identification to 
reduce the positive effect of organizational identification on individuals’ UPB. 
 Moral potency’s effect on individuals’ UPB. 
Although moral potency was hypothesized to reduce individuals’ UPB, it was 
somewhat unexpected to find that it had the single largest direct effect and the largest 
total effect on individuals’ willingness to engage in UPB. The theoretical connection 
between moral potency and willingness to engage in UPB could not be clearer. Moral 
potency is thought to represent one’s personal capacity to complete the final two steps of 
the EDM process: to choose the ethical option when faced with a dilemma, and then to 
follow through on the decision with one’s actions (Rest, 1986). Based on this theory, 
individuals’ moral potency will not only relate directly to individuals’ intentions towards 
UPB, but also individuals’ true level of UPB engagement in the workplace. 
These results suggest that along with the workplace environment, employees’ 
individual differences play a large role in shaping individuals’ willingness to engage in 
UPB. The moral ownership and courage dimension may play a particularly crucial role in 
preventing UPB in workplaces that lack the safeguard of a highly ethical climate. Moral 
139 
ownership and courage represents one’s sense of responsibility to make ethical choices 
and one’s commitment to moral values despite any opposing pressures (Hannah & 
Avolio, 2010). Theoretically, individuals with strong moral ownership and courage 
would be compelled to behave ethically in any setting, even in environments that might 
otherwise promote UPB. 
Moral potency’s effect on departmental UPB. 
Moral potency was also found to have a significant negative effect on department-
wide UPB. This was unpredicted, as it was unexpected that an internal individual trait 
held by a single employee would have a noticeable effect on the overall UPB within the 
department. 
It is possible that this effect was due to the fact that individuals’ moral potency 
decreased individual willingness towards UPB, and that the amount of UPB committed 
by the individual would affect the average amount of UPB in that individual’s 
department. This is a conceivable explanation, but would only produce a significant 
effect if the average number of employees within participants’ departments was relatively 
low. Unfortunately, participants were not asked to report the size of their department, so 
this premise cannot be tested. 
Perhaps a more plausible explanation for the effect of individuals’ moral potency 
on department-wide UPB is that coworkers avoid engaging in UPB around employees 
who have high moral potency. Past research has found that those higher in moral potency 
are more likely to report others for engaging in unethical actions (Schaubroeck et al., 
2010) and to confront coworkers who behaved unethically (Hannah et al., 2011). Perhaps 
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employees who act on their moral values in these ways develop a reputation for being 
intolerant of unethical behavior, which would lead coworkers to avoid engaging in any 
UPB around those employees. In this way, participants high in moral potency might 
report inaccurately low rates of department-wide UPB. 
Another more optimistic explanation is that the presence of even a single 
employee with high moral potency can truly have a significant effect on the rates of UPB 
within their department. One of the defining characteristics of individuals with moral 
potency act is that they act with conviction to uphold their ethical values, no matter the 
obstacles (Hannah et al., 2011). Perhaps through constantly role modeling ethical 
behavior and forcibly opposing unethical behavior, individual employees with high moral 
potency are capable of significantly reducing department-wide UPB. 
Moral potency’s interaction with organizational identification. 
Individuals’ moral potency was found to moderate the effect of individuals’ 
organizational identification on their willingness to engage in UPB. This was expected, as 
moral potency represents one’s willingness to take the ethical course of action despite 
any pressure (internal or external) to act unethically (Hannah et al., 2011). Organizational 
identification exerted the single largest positive effect on individuals’ willingness to 
engage in UPB. The fact that moral potency exerted the largest negative effect on 
individuals’ UPB and also helped to control the largest positive effect on individuals’ 
UPB demonstrates the critical importance of moral potency for predicting individuals’ 
willingness towards UPB in the workplace. 
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The present study was the first to examine the effect of moral potency on UPB; 
the findings highlight the continued need to study this construct as a means of predicting 
and even reducing UPB in the workplace. Although conceptualized as an individual-level 
internal attribute, the relationships that moral potency demonstrated with departmental 
UPB and departmental ethical climate suggest that an individual employee’s moral 
potency has the potential to affect the attitudes and behaviors of the surrounding group. 
Also, despite being considered as a stable trait, the correlation with ethical climate also 
suggests that employees’ moral potency may be affected by their surrounding 
environment, indicating the potential to increase employees’ moral potency through 
organizational interventions. 
Goals climate. 
The goals climate measure used in this study showed significant psychometric 
issues. Although goals climate was expected to be a single factor, CFA results indicated a 
two factor structure. Several items were also dropped due to low reliability. Although 
there was a promising theoretical basis for the two factor structure, and a reasonable 
argument for a relationship between pressuring goals climate and UPB, no significant 
main effects were found between either of the goals climate dimension and UPB. An 
interaction was found between ethical climate and pressuring goals climate predicting 
individuals’ UPB, but the lack of a main effect from pressuring goals climate made the 
results of this interaction difficult to interpret. These findings suggest a need to redesign 
the goals climate measure, using more robust theoretically-driven methods. 
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Goals Climate Scale factor structure. 
Due to poor fit, the original single Goals Climate Scale factor was separated into 
two, and the resulting two factors did not fit well as a single second order factor. Still, the 
two factors that emerged from the Goals Climate Scale demonstrate a potential new 
categorization on which to assess goals climate. The single goals climate factor was 
separated into dimensions: pressuring goals climate and empowering goals climate. 
Although both dimensions relate to individuals’ perceptions of the importance of 
achieving departmental goals, the items within the pressuring goals climate dimension 
center on management emphasis of goals (Meeting goals is a top priority of the 
management in my department) and the presence of negative consequences if goals are 
not reached (If goals in the department are not met, employees could face negative job-
related consequences). In contrast, the items in the empowering goals climate dimension 
relate to the extent to which employees are involved in goals achievement strategies 
(Employees in my department are regularly consulted about how best to meet department 
goals) and given the necessary tools to be successful on department goals (Training 
programs in my department primarily focus on how to achieve goals). 
These two goals climate dimensions seem to align with the two strategies for 
pursuing goals outlined in regulatory focus theory: prevention focus and promotion focus 
(Higgins, 1998). According to regulatory focus theory, those with a prevention focus are 
motivated to fulfill concrete duties and obligations and to avoid undesirable outcomes, 
whereas those with a promotion focus are motivated by a need for accomplishment and 
forward progress, and desire to maximize future gains. Pressuring goals climate, which is 
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characterized by management control and punitive consequences, seems to frame goals 
climate using a prevention focus. Empowering goals climate, which involves developing 
employees’ goal achievement potential and strategizing on how best to reach goals, 
aligns nicely with promotion focus. Individuals have a trait predisposition towards a 
particular regulatory focus (Higgins, 1998), but situational context and framing can also 
influence individuals’ regulatory focus (Freitas, Liberman, & Higgins, 2002). 
Theoretically, this could mean that a strong pressuring goals climate could increase 
employees’ prevention focus for goal achievement, while a strong empowering goals 
climate could increase employees’ promotion focus. Past research suggests that 
individuals are more likely to engage in UPB to prevent a loss than to achieve a gain 
(Beams, Brown, & Killough, 2003) and that the use of loss framing can increase 
willingness towards UPB (Graham et al., 2015). This indicates that a high pressuring 
goals climate may have a stronger effect on increasing UPB than an empowering goals 
climate. 
Goals climate and UPB. 
No main effects were found between either goals climate dimension and 
individuals’ UPB or departmental UPB. Perhaps, as asserted in organizational climate 
theory, strategic outcome climates only influence employee behavior when the 
prerequisite foundational climates are in place to provide the necessary supportive 
environment (Schneider et al., 2011). This would suggest that strategic climates like 
goals climate effect relevant outcomes entirely through interactions with foundational 
climates such as ethical climate, and have no main effect on their own. A significant 
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interaction was found between ethical climate and pressuring goals climate as predicted, 
but in the absence of a main effect between pressuring goals climate and UPB, the effect 
of the interaction is perplexing. The results indicate that as expected, pressuring goals 
climate has a positive effect on individuals’ UPB when ethical climate is high. However, 
the results also suggest that when ethical climate is low, pressuring goals climate has a 
negative relationship with individuals’ willingness towards UPB. Based on the 
foundational climate argument, the relationship between pressuring goals climate and 
UPB should be flat when ethical climate is low and become positive as ethical climate 
increases. 
Perhaps the combination of a high pressuring goals climate and low ethical 
climate creates a sufficiently toxic environment that employees are motivated to act 
counterproductively against the organization. This would increase certain types of 
unethical workplace behaviors such as employee theft and sabotage, but would decrease 
UPB. Perhaps the interaction between ethical climate and goals climate is in fact 
curvilinear rather than linear, starting flat at low ethical climate before sloping upwards 
and becoming positive at moderate and high levels of ethical climate. This interaction 
would create simple slopes for goals climate predicting individuals’ UPB that would 
comply with the foundational climate theory, without the need for goals climate to have a 
positive main effect. 
Another likely explanation for the present study’s unexpected results involving 
goals climate is that this study’s Goals Climate Scale did not accurately represent the 
goals climate construct, and therefore was ineffective for testing the true relationship 
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between goals climate and UPB. There are several factors that favor this explanation, 
including the fact that the Goals Climate Scale has undergone multiple adaptations, had 
never been validated as a measure of goals climate, and demonstrated major 
psychometric issues during this study’s CFA. The significant interaction found between 
pressuring goals climate and ethical climate indicates some effectiveness of the Goals 
Climate Scale to predict UPB, but the questionable validity of the Goals Climate Scale 
dampens the credibility and interpretability of this finding. 
Moral ideology and UPB. 
Like with goals climate, the majority of the hypotheses involving individuals’ 
moral ideology were not supported. A significant negative effect was found between 
individuals’ idealism and individuals’ willingness towards UPB as predicted, but this 
effect was only supported in two out of three versions of the Final Model. When 
controlling for method effects with the IM marker variable, the effect of idealism on 
individuals’ UPB was reduced slightly, which was sufficient to make the effect no longer 
significant. Idealism was not found to interact with ethical climate, organizational 
identification, or goals climate to predict individuals’ willingness towards UPB. 
Relativism did not significantly predict individuals’ intentions towards UPB in any way, 
whether through a main effect or an interaction. 
It should be noted that at least some of the effect of idealism on individuals’ 
willingness towards UPB was diminished due to having shared explained variance with 
moral potency, another individual difference variable. Idealism and moral potency were 
highly correlated and both had a strong negative correlation with individuals’ willingness 
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towards UPB, although moral potency’s negative correlation with individuals’ UPB was 
larger. It is likely that the negative effect of idealism on individuals’ willingness towards 
UPB would have been stronger if moral potency had not been included in the model. 
Another explanation for the unexpectedly weak effect of idealism on UPB is that, 
because the items in the Idealism subscale refer to individual potential victims, the scale 
is less relevant for predicting UPB than anticipated. The idealism construct theoretically 
measures the extent of one’s concern for the welfare of all people when making 
decisions, but the items within the Idealism subscale often reference a singular potential 
victim (e.g., never intentionally harm another; harm another person; welfare of another 
individual). When employees commit UPB in the workplace, the potential victims are 
often dispersed and unidentified. For example, the victims of Volkswagen’s diesel 
emissions fraud were the deceived customers and the global environment; the engineers 
responsible for the fraud most likely did not have direct contact with individual victims. 
Because the Idealism subscale mostly indexes concern for individual potential victims, 
this variable may not be as effective for predicting UPB as was predicted in this study. 
It could also be that problems with the EPQ (Forsyth, 1980), the scale used to 
measure ethical ideology, limited this study’s capacity to predict the true relationship 
between individuals’ ethical ideology and UPB. Although the factor structure of the EPQ 
was as expected, several items from both the idealism and relativism subscales had to be 
removed due to low reliability. Compared to the other measures included in this study, 
most items from the EPQ were longer, required a higher reading level, and used unusual 
expressions. The items from the relativism subscale were particularly challenging (e.g., 
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Rigidly codifying an ethical position that prevents certain types of actions could stand in 
the way of better human relations and adjustment). Although the EPQ is well supported 
as a valid predictor of ethical decision making and has been used in more than 50 
empirical studies, perhaps the 37 year old scale has become somewhat outdated. It seems 
likely that a scale using more up-to-date language and straightforward sentence structure 
may more accurately measure the ethical ideology of the average worker, and therefore 
may be a more valid predictor of that worker’s intentions towards UPB. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
 Ethical climate. 
This study advanced the understanding of the complex relationship between 
ethical climate and UPB, but still left many questions unanswered. The curvilinear 
relationship between ethical climate and UPB was supported, but the significance of the 
simple slopes at various levels of ethical climate were not tested due to practical 
statistical constraints. Future research should test the significance of these simple slopes 
to determine the level of ethical climate that is necessary to significantly reduce 
individuals’ willingness towards UPB. These tests would also be able to identify which 
levels of ethical climate are most likely to increase UPB. 
Future research should also seek an explanation for why highly ethical climates 
appear to be exponentially more effective at reducing UPB than other levels of ethical 
climate. Perhaps future research could measure certain ethical climate antecedents, such 
as ethical policies and protocols, to test the theory that highly ethical climates are 
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distinctive due to their consistent alignment of all workplace cues that contribute to 
perceptions of ethical climate. 
Although the hypothesized interaction was found between ethical climate and 
pressuring goals climate predicting individuals’ UPB, the simple slopes of the interaction 
did not conform to the foundational climate argument because there was no main effect 
for pressuring goals climate. One potential explanation is that ethical climate’s interaction 
with other climates is curvilinear rather than linear. Future research should investigate 
this by testing for more complex interactions between ethical climate and other 
workplace climates when predicting UPB. 
Finally, moral motivation was found to be the most important dimension within 
ethical climate for predicting UPB. Regrettably, because this study used the abridged 
version of the ECI, the Moral Motivation factor was measured with only three items. 
Future UPB research may benefit from including the full version of this subscale rather 
than the shorted version, in order to have a more reliable measure of this most important 
ethical climate dimension for predicting UPB.  
Study design. 
Many of the limitations of this study were due to the distributed participant 
sample and the cross-sectional survey design. 
This study’s non-aggregated sample most likely limited the effect of ethical 
climate to predict department-level UPB. Future research using an aggregated 
organizational sample would be a major advancement for UPB research, as it would 
allow for more accurate representations of department-level variables. This would 
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generate more accurate predictions of how a department’s ethical climate affects 
department-level UPB. An aggregated design would be better suited to determine if the 
relationship between ethical climate and departmental UPB is curvilinear or linear, and 
would also be helpful for testing interactions between multiple climates to predict 
department-level UPB. 
Although there are theoretical arguments for the causal direction of the 
relationships tested in this study, the cross-sectional design prevented the development of 
any causal conclusions from the findings. Future studies should consider a longitudinal 
design in order to provide empirical causal support for the theoretical mechanisms behind 
individuals’ willingness towards UPB.  
Moral potency. 
This study found that moral potency has a profound effect on UPB at the 
individual level, and even influences UPB at the department level. Future research should 
continue to study moral potency as an avenue for predicting UPB, and perhaps as an 
intervention strategy for reducing UPB in the workplace. It would be valuable to develop 
a better understanding of the unexpected relationships found between individuals’ moral 
potency and the attitudes and behaviors of coworkers within the department. Using a 
longitudinal design and an aggregated sample, future research could test the causal 
relationships between individuals’ moral potency and department-level ethical climate 
and individuals’ moral potency and department-level UPB. Another potential avenue for 
research is to study potential strategies for increasing individuals’ moral potency. This 
could be a useful tool for organizations to reduce the risk of UPB in the workplace. 
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Organizational concern and ethical sensitivity. 
This study measured individuals’ organizational identification as a proxy for 
organizational concern, as there are no scales currently available to measure 
organizational concern directly. To provide more concrete support for the theory of the 
dueling motivational mechanisms predicting UPB, it would be useful for future research 
to develop measures of organizational concern and ethical sensitivity. Having valid 
measures for these theoretical constructs would advance UPB research by conclusively 
demonstrating the motivational mechanisms behind UPB. 
 Goals Climate Scale. 
 This study encountered many challenges involving the Goals Climate Scale. CFA 
results indicated that the scale had some reliability issues as well as serious 
dimensionality issues. Despite best efforts to address these problems through post hoc 
revisions, the majority of the predicted effects of goals climate were not supported. 
Future research should address this by developing a more theoretically valid and 
statistically robust measure of goals climate that can be used to further our understanding 
of how climates interact to predict UPB. 
Ethical ideology. 
The EPQ also demonstrated some psychometric issues and was mostly ineffective 
in predicting UPB. Revisions to modernize the EPQ would likely increase its validity for 
measuring idealism and relativism, and may increase its predictive validity for studying 
UPB. However, considering the overlap between the constructs of idealism and moral 
potency and moral potency’s superior predictive validity on UPB, it may be unnecessary 
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to include both personal morality variables in future studies. Rather than including all 
possible variables, it may be more beneficial for future UPB research to focus on 
developing an effective yet parsimonious model for understanding the mechanisms 
behind individuals’ willingness towards UPB. 
Practical Conclusions 
Employees are motivated to commit UPB due to organizational concern, or their 
desire to help the organization succeed. For this reason, UPB is often not associated with 
the same predictors as other unethical workplace behaviors. UPB may be more common 
in supportive organizations that prioritize the ethical treatment of their employees. Also, 
employees who engage in UPB tend to have high organizational identification, and 
therefore may not fit the profile of a typical “problem” employee.  
 The motivating factor that influences employees away from UPB is ethical 
sensitivity, or the extent that they value ethical considerations when making decisions. 
Individuals’ ethical sensitivity is influenced by environmental factors like the ethical 
climate of the workplace and internal factors such as moral potency. 
Although it would seem logical that improving the ethical climate in the 
workplace would be an effective way to discourage UPB, the relationship between ethical 
climate and UPB is complicated. Higher ethical climates increase employees’ ethical 
sensitivity, but the supportive workplace environment that ethical climates create also 
increases workers’ organizational concern. It seems that although higher ethical climates 
do tend to reduce UPB overall, having a moderately ethical climate can actually increase 
UPB compared to a low ethical climate. It may be that only highly ethical climates 
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significantly reduce individuals’ willingness towards UPB. Moreover, even a highly 
ethical climate may be ineffective in controlling UPB in workplaces that put a very strong 
emphasis on achieving organizational goals. 
Along with the workplace environment, employees’ individual differences also 
play a large role in shaping individuals’ willingness to engage in UPB. Moral potency has 
been found to play a critical role in reducing UPB, both within the individual and 
department-wide. Moral potency refers to an individual’s sense of responsibility to make 
ethical choices, personal conviction to uphold moral values in the face of opposition, and 
confidence in their ability to achieve an ethical outcome. This combination of internal 
attributes not only vastly decreases one’s own UPB tendencies, but also seems to 
influence coworkers’ behavior and departmental ethical climate. Organizations should 
promote the expression of moral potency in the workplace, and perhaps look for ways to 
actively increase the moral potency of employees. 
Although employees’ organizational concern is understandably valued and 
encouraged by all organizations, this study demonstrates the potential unintended 
consequences when employees’ organizational concern outweighs their ethical 
sensitivity. Organizations must be aware of the role that employee attitudes like 
organizational identification and traits like moral potency have on influencing UPB in 
order to recognize potential problems before they occur. Organizations must also be 
conscious of the ethical climate and goals climate within their workplace and consider the 
message that the workplace climate sends to employees. If an organization plans to 
improve its ethical climate as a means of discouraging UPB, the organization must 
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commit to achieving a highly ethical climate that unequivocally sends the message that 
ethical values should never be compromised. 
Organizations must find effective strategies to prevent UPB, not only to fulfill 
their ethical responsibility to their stakeholders, but also to protect the company’s 
reputation and bottom line. Although more research is needed, the results of this study 
suggest that organizations can assess their risk by monitoring workplace ethical climate, 
goals climate, and employee moral potency, and reduce their overall risk through 
maintaining a highly ethical climate. 
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Appendix A 
Ethical Climate Index 
Moral Awareness 
1. People around here are aware of ethical issues. 
2. People in my department recognize a moral dilemma right away. 
3. People in my department are very sensitive to ethical problems. 
Empathetic Concern 
1. People in my department sympathize with someone who is having difficulties in 
their job. 
 
2. For the most part, when people around here see that someone is treated unfairly, 
they feel pity for that person. 
 
3. People around here feel bad for someone who is being taken advantage of. 
4. In my department people feel sorry for someone who is having problems. 
Focus on Self 
1. People around here are mostly out for themselves. 
2. People in my department think of their own welfare first when faced with a 
difficult decision. 
 
3. In my Department people’s primary concern is their own personal benefit. 
Focus on Others 
1. People around here have a strong sense of responsibility to society and humanity. 
2. What is best for everyone in the department is the major consideration. 
3. The most important concern is the good of all the people in the department. 
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Moral Motivation 
1. In my department people are willing to break the rules in order to advance in the 
company. 
 
2. Around here, power is more important than honesty. 
3. In order to control scarce resources, people in my department are willing to 
compromise their ethical values somewhat. 
 
Moral Character 
1. People I work with would feel they had to help a peer even if that person were not 
a very helpful person. 
 
2. People in my department feel it is better to assume responsibility for a mistake. 
3. No matter how much people around here are provoked, they are always 
responsible for whatever they do. 
 
Note: From publication by Arnaud (2010). 
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Appendix B 
Goals Climate Scale  
1. Management in my department places a strong emphasis on meeting goals. 
2. The achieving of goals drives most decisions at my department. 
3. Meeting goals is a top priority of the management in my department. 
4. The main focus in my department is on meeting goals. Everything else is secondary. 
5. There is frequent communication about issues related to meeting goals in my 
department. 
 
6. Employees in my department are able to discuss goal achievement issues in meetings. 
7. Employees in my department are regularly consulted about how best to meet 
department goals.  
 
8. How to meet department goals is given high priority in training programs for 
employees in my department. 
 
9. Employees in my department receive comprehensive training regarding how best to 
meet their goals. 
 
10. Training programs for employees in my department primarily focus on how to 
achieve goals. 
 
11. Performance evaluations for employees in my department are primarily based on 
whether employees did their part to help the company meet goals. 
 
12. If goals in the department are not met, employees could face negative job-related 
consequences. 
 
13. Management in my department praises employees that help the company meet goals. 
Note: Adapted from Productivity Climate Scale, published by Jiang and Probst (2015). 
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Appendix C 
Organizational Identification 
1. When someone criticizes my company, it feels like a personal insult. 
2. I am very interested in what others think about my company. 
3. When I talk about this company, I usually say ‘we’ rather than ‘they’. 
4. This company’s successes are my successes. 
5. When someone praises this company, it feels like a personal compliment. 
6. If a story in the media criticized the company, I would feel embarrassed. 
Note: From publication by Mael and Ashforth (1992). 
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Appendix D 
Ethical Position Questionnaire 
Idealism 
 
1. A person should make certain that their actions never intentionally harm another 
even to a small degree. 
 
2. Risks to another should never be tolerated, irrespective of how small the risks 
might be. 
 
3. The existence of potential harm to others is always wrong, irrespective of the 
benefits to be gained. 
 
4. One should never psychologically or physically harm another person. 
 
5. One should not perform an action which might in any may threaten the dignity 
and welfare of another individual. 
 
6. If an action could harm an innocent other, then it should not be done. 
 
7. Deciding whether or not to perform an act by balancing the positive consequences 
of the act against the negative consequences of the act is immoral. 
 
8. The dignity and welfare of people should be the most important concern in any 
society. 
 
9. It is never necessary to sacrifice the welfare of others. 
 
10. Moral action are those which closely match the ideals of the most “perfect” 
action. 
 
Relativism 
 
1. There are no ethical principles that are so important that they should be part of 
any code of ethics. 
 
2. What is ethical varies from one situation and society to another. 
 
3. Moral standards should be seen as being individualistic; what one person 
considers to be moral may be judged to be immoral by another person. 
 
4. Different types of moralities cannot be compared as to “rightness.” 
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5. Questions of what is ethical for everyone can never be resolved since what is 
moral or immoral is up to the individual. 
 
6. Moral standards are simply personal rules which indicate how a person should 
behave, and are not to be applied in making judgments of others. 
 
7. Ethical considerations in interpersonal relations are so complex that individuals 
should be allowed to formulate their own individual codes. 
 
8. Rigidly codifying an ethical position that prevents certain types of actions could 
stand in the way of better human relations and adjustment. 
 
9. No rule concerning lying can be formulated; whether a lie is permissible or not 
permissible totally depends on the situation. 
 
10. Whether a lie is judged to be moral or immoral depends on the circumstances 
surrounding the action. 
 
Note: From publication by Forsyth (1980). 
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Appendix E 
Moral Potency Questionnaire 
Moral Courage 
1. I will confront my peers if they commit an unethical act. 
Moral Ownership 
1. I will assume responsibility to take action when I see an unethical act. 
Moral Efficacy 
1. I am confident that I can readily see the moral/ethical implications in the 
challenges I face. 
Note: Full scale is not included due to its proprietary nature. For information on how to 
obtain the full scale, see publication by Hannah and Avolio (2010). 
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Appendix F 
Unethical Pro-Organizational Behavior 
1. If it would help my organization, I would misrepresent the truth to make my 
organization look good. 
 
2. If it would help my organization, I would exaggerate the truth about my company’s 
products or services to customers and clients. 
 
3. If it would help my organization, I would withhold negative information about my 
company or its products from customers and clients. 
 
4. If my organization needed me to, I would give a good recommendation on the behalf 
of an incompetent employee in the hope that the person will become another 
organization’s problem instead of my own. 
 
5. If my organization needed me to, I would withhold issuing a refund to a customer or 
client accidentally overcharged. 
 
6. If needed, I would conceal information from the public that could be damaging to my 
organization. 
 
Note: From publication by Umphress, Bingham, and Mitchell (2010). 
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Appendix G 
Departmental Unethical Pro-Organizational Behavior 
How frequently have you seen the following behaviors from members of your 
department? 
 
1. Employees misrepresenting the truth to make the organization look good. 
 
2. Employees exaggerating the truth about the company’s products or services to 
customers and clients. 
 
3. Employees withholding negative information about the company or its products 
from customers and clients. 
 
4. Employees giving a good recommendation on the behalf of an incompetent 
employee in the hope that the person will become another organization’s problem. 
 
5. Employees withholding issuing a refund to a customer or client accidentally 
overcharged. 
 
6. Employees concealing information from the public that could be damaging to my 
organization. 
 
Note: Adapted from publication by Umphress, Bingham, and Mitchell (2010). 
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Appendix H 
Fear Tolerance 
1. I tend to face my fears. 
2. If the thought of something makes me anxious, I usually will avoid it. 
3. Even if I feel terrified, I will stay in that situation until I have done what I need to do. 
 
4. If something scares me, I try to get away from it. 
5. Other people describe me as courageous. 
6. I would describe myself as ‘‘chicken’’. 
7. I will do things even though they seem to be dangerous. 
8. I act in a courageous way. 
9. If I am worried or anxious about something, I will do or face it anyway. 
10. If there is an important reason to face something that scares me, I will face it. 
11. Even if something scares me, I will not back down. 
12. I will not face something I fear, even if avoiding it will have a negative outcome for 
me. 
 
Note: From publication by Norton and Weiss (2009). 
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Appendix I 
Impression Management 
1. I sometimes tell lies if I have to. 
2. I never cover up my mistakes. 
3. There have been occasions when I have taken advantage of someone. 
4. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget. 
5. I have said something bad about a friend behind his or her back. 
6. When I hear people talking privately, I avoid listening. 
7. I never take things that don’t belong to me. 
8. I don’t gossip about other people’s business. 
Note: From the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding Short Form, in publication 
by Hart, Ritchie, Hepper, and Gebauer (2015). 
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